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Few studies examine whistle-blowing from an organization’s self-regulating perspective.  
The LAPD is one of the few municipal agencies that offer its employees 8 or more 
misconduct reporting avenues to choose from.  Yet, despite this large number of 
resources, many police officers have opted to file civil lawsuits rather than utilize internal 
resources to resolve reports of specific types of misconduct.  A total of 131 sergeants, 
detectives, lieutenants, captains and commanders were surveyed in 2009 regarding their 
likelihood of reporting specific types of organizational misconduct to any one of the 
internal departmental resources provided.  Findings revealed 65% of the police officers 
were likely to report any 1 of 8 specific types of misconduct allegations to department 
supervisors, as opposed to any of the more specialized internal investigative options.  
Over 70% of the officers were likely to report sexual harassment, hostile work 
environment allegations and receiving disparate treatment due to having a work related 
disability, to their chain of command.  
Lesser known specialized resources were reported as the least likely to be used.  
Reasons reported by respondents for not using internal resource options included a lack 
of trust or confidence in unknown resources, fear of backlash from peers, or that they 
simply preferred a less time consuming investigative process.  
The study also examined the perceived impacts associated with reporting 
misconduct.  Alienation or silent treatment by peers and harsh treatment by co-workers 
were rated as the most likely impacts of reporting misconduct. 
The high percentage of police officers who are willing to report misconduct 
through the LAPD’s chain of command is significant in that it assures management that 
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mid level supervisors may have the influential power needed to improve the internal 
reporting misconduct complaints, enhance compliance with employment discrimination 
laws, and lessen the incidents of employees preferring external options to report 
misconduct.   
Recommendations for enhancing LAPD resource options for employees include 
limiting the number of resources for reports of employment discrimination to one 
specialized unit, enhancing training for supervisors, periodic quality service audits of 
reporting resources to determine their effectiveness, and external LAPD oversight of the 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Problem Statement 
 Police, fire and military professions are very unique in that they each “possess an 
unparalleled need for loyalty, solidarity, and protection (Kingshot, Bailey, & Wolf, 2004; 
Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007) given that they can be life threatening at any moment 
whether working in a patrol or administrative assignment.  Police officer training dictates, 
particularly when assigned to patrol assignments that each officer must be able to count 
on and in fact, depend on their partner’s dedicated response in every given moment of 
every call in order to protect one another from harm.  Without this level of trust in one’s 
partner “being there” the chances of an officer becoming seriously injured or killed 
significantly increases and daily work becomes an increasingly frightening and life-
threatening experience.   
 The fears related to whistle-blowing or reporting the wrong-doing of peers are as 
real as they are common.  In fact, the initial internal thoughts that emerge at the mere 
thought of whistle-blowing against another officer can result in real and perceived acts of 
peer isolation, marital problems, physical or emotional health (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 
2008), career suicide (losing promotions or assignments), and even the possibility of 
intentionally being put in harm’s way.  And, it is because of these fears associated with 
whistle-blowing that employees silence themselves from reporting misconduct (Lewis, 
2002) and police officers are no different.    
Fear of being isolated from other co-workers, losing promotional opportunities or 
career suicide are two of several significant causes for conscious and maybe even 
unconscious silencing on the part of employees who witness or experience organizational 
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wrongdoing.  Police officers are duty bound to immediately report (whistle-blow) any 
illegal activity or deviance of policy and procedure committed by another employee to 
his/her supervisor or be subjected to serious scrutiny and discipline.  This duty to report 
policy deviance or misconduct is usually enforced through the use of written policy and is 
a way that for the agency to assure the public of its ability to police its own organization 
effectively.  Police agencies, like the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), in their 
attempts to lessen the probability of intentional silencing or unwritten code of silence, 
offer employees a variety of misconduct reporting resources, many of which can be 
summoned anonymously. 
Police officers learn fairly quickly to unconditionally trust their brother and sister 
officer for protection and back up assistance during life threatening situations.  This 
uniquely close relationship builds into a strong cohesive and protective bond among 
officers (Henik, 2007; King, 2003).  This relationship also has the propensity however, to 
create an “us versus them” mindset that could over time become shrouded in a bond of 
quid pro quo secrecy (watching each other at all cost) or code of silence.  In order to 
prevent relationships from becoming too protective to a point where protection extends 
beyond physical safety to one of mutual protection from “them” (management and 
outsiders), some agencies require officers to rotate partners and shifts periodically.   
The purpose of this study is to examine the decision-making process used by 
police officers for determining (a) where and how to report specific acts of employee 
misconduct, (b) the perceived likelihood of utilizing one or more LAPD internal 
reporting avenues for managing reports of employee misconduct, and (c) the actual 
and/or perceived consequences of whistle-blowing experienced by employees, so as to 
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assist managers in learning how to properly manage employee reports of misconduct 
while simultaneously minimizing and/or deterring acts of retaliation against whistle-
blowers. This study particularly concentrated on the act and impact of reporting specific 
types of wrongdoing or misconduct committed by officers with respect to gender/race 
discrimination, hostile work environment, co-worker harassment, disability 
discrimination and other internal acts of employment misconduct.  By comparing the 
various types of wrong-doing witnessed by officers it would prove beneficial to managers 
seeking to understand the conditions that most often influence an employee’s decision-
making process in reporting wrong-doing, the impact of such reporting to the employee 
and organization, what type(s) of reported conduct has resulted in real or perceived 
retaliatory conduct, and lastly, what reporting avenues yield the highest perceived 
negative impact? 
Significance of the Study 
The term whistle-blower and the act of whistle-blowing in any context are often 
viewed as a negative and risky activity.  For many of us our first indoctrination about the 
risks of whistle-blowing and loyalty conflicts begin in the childhood years.  Consider the 
messages young children receive at their first experience of informing (whistle-blowing) 
on another child or adult for doing something wrong.  Much too often, these complaints 
are silenced by well-meaning or sometimes ill-meaning receivers of this information 
(parents, teachers, and other peers) through the use of descriptive name-calling, 
“teacher’s pet, tattle-tale, cry baby, snitch, or worse, rat fink,” to name a few.  We also 
grow up learning about “loyalty” by our family members who warn of not disclosing 
family secrets, from our siblings and peers who swear us to silence with the sharing of 
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secrets, our school mates who cheat on exams, and many more. And, when we enter the 
working world, employee loyalty to the organization and to our co-workers is not only 
presumed but an “expression of bonding” (Johnson, 2003, p. 26).   
The act of informing about wrongdoing or whistle-blowing is a process that can 
result in the creation of a new and improved organization or cause its demise.  Whistle-
blowers, whether they are viewed as corruption busters seeking to improve the 
organization or “disloyal rats” with self-serving motives, surface in all types of industries 
and organizations.  Corporate whistle-blowing can result in a number of repercussions, 
such as co-worker alienation, job loss, job status, or actually becoming the catalyst for the 
organizations downfall.  Consider, however, there are also consequences for the whistle-
blower who reports the wrongful actions of peers or supervisors who they must depend 
upon for job security and personal safety because of the very nature of that profession. 
The initial witnessing of wrongdoing, internal processing of ethical values, 
decision to report the wrongdoing, up to eventual disclosure of the witnessed behavior is 
a lengthy and most times unrewarding internal and external process (Dworkin & Baucus, 
1998; Miceli & Near, 1992).  How can an organization encourage the internal whistle-
blowing process while managing real fears about retaliation?  Are internal reporting 
resources effective in encouraging whistle-blowing while discouraging negative impacts 
that may occur such as retaliation?  I once heard an adage in response to the question of 
racial equality, “…just because the ‘white only’ sign is off of the water fountain…does 
not mean that racism does not exist” (unknown author).  The same may hold true for 
organizational directives and codes of conduct that exist on paper while the culture acts 
on a different set of unwritten rules for behavior.  Failure on the part of any organization 
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to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation or retribution has far reaching affects.  Court 
settlements that have plagued both the City of Los Angeles and its police department in 
the last 6 years demonstrate that juries are becoming more and more sympathetic to 
whistle-blowers who are raising the topic of organizational retaliation.   
      In August 2000, Bradley C. Gage, Los Angeles attorney, spearheaded a class-
action lawsuit representing 40 current and former Los Angeles Police Officers.  The 
officers alleged acts of retaliation, fostering, condoning, and participating in the existence 
of an organizational code of silence that punishes those who report misconduct.  The 
officers complained of organizational forms of retaliation by way of forced transfers, 
hostile treatment, and other adverse employment actions.  Mr. Gage was quoted in the 
Los Angeles Times as saying, “these good cops fear their own administration and 
management more than the criminals on the street” (Lait & Glover, 2000, p. A1). 
       In December 2003, the Los Angeles City Council agreed to settle a $2 million 
dollar lawsuit initiated by a Los Angeles Police Officer after he was allegedly retaliated 
against for the reporting of excessive force he witnessed.  During these same 
proceedings, another $2 million dollars was awarded to an additional eight Los Angeles 
Police Officers for similar typed lawsuits which claimed one or more egregious forms of 
organizational retaliation for the reporting of internal wrongdoing.  Ironically, when 
interviewed by a Los Angeles Times Staff Writer at the conclusion of these jury awards, 
then Police Chief Bernard Parks expressed his disappointment with the trend of 
employees “who get in trouble and seek to use retaliation as a defense” (Garrison & 
Glover, 2003, p. B1).  Sadly, this type of management mindset has overtime become 
ingrained in the organization’s culture at all levels of the organization.  Whistle-blowing 
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police officers are often viewed by peer level employees as self-serving and disloyal both 
to the organization and their profession. Management level employees commonly view 
whistle-blowers as being low performing malcontents with a personal axe to grind.  
Regardless of perceived motives, the cost of whistle-blowing creates a rippling effect that 
is very hard to recover from.   
 In June 2006, a Los Angeles Police Officer was awarded $225, 000 when he 
alleged that his supervisors retaliated against him by reassigning him far from home in a 
move that is known internally as a form of freeway therapy after reporting his peers for 
falsifying racial data information required on traffic stop reports (McGeevy, 2006).  In 
October 2007, a female officer was awarded $1 million after she claimed that she was 
demoted three levels down after reporting her superior officer for promoting other female 
colleagues who had allegedly performed sexual favors for him (Kim, 2008a).   
      In November 2008, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously approved a $2.25 
million settlement to a female Los Angeles Police officer who claimed she was retaliated 
against by co-workers and supervisors when she reported egregious acts of sexual 
misconduct.  The officer claimed that peers and supervisors maintained a “good ole’ boy” 
work climate that would have any female officer cringe with disdain.  After reporting her 
partners for sexually explicit sexual bantering, exposure of genitals, and being excluded 
from training exercises and office meetings, the officer was denied a promotion and 
falsely accused of misconduct (Kim, 2008b). 
      One week prior to this most recent award, a Los Angeles County Superior Court 
awarded $3.6 million to a male Los Angeles Police officer who defended the female 
officer listed in the above jury $2.25 jury award.  The male officer claimed he was 
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retaliated against by being transferred and demoted after he spoke up and corroborated 
the fact that his female co-worker had been subjected to a pervasive sexually offensive 
work environment created by other male co-workers (Kim, 2008a; Lin, 2008).  Within 
months of this settlement, a Los Angeles jury awarded $3.1 million to a Los Angeles 
Police Officer who claimed he was retaliated against when he reported his supervisor for 
embezzlement.  The officer claimed he was verbally harassed, called a “rat” by peer 
officers, and unjustly transferred to a less desirable job assignment (Kim, 2008b). 
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the act and impact of whistle-
blowing by police officers who report acts of organizational wrong-doing within the Los 
Angeles Police Department.   In light of the continued lawsuit settlements in favor of the 
police officer plaintiffs who blew the whistle on what they perceived as organizational 
wrong-doing on the LAPD in the past few years, it is evident that the public and police 
officers are finally on the same sheet of music and are sending a strong message.  The 
LAPD cannot ignore or excuse the high cost of whistle-blowing and reported acts of 
employee retaliation.  A close examination as to why police officers are filing claims 
outside of the organization while internal resolution avenues exist and how the 
organization responds to reports of workplace wrong-doing was conducted to determine 
the gravity and scope of the problem so that the organization can address and manage it 
swiftly and properly. 
 The statements reportedly made by Chief Parks, past police officer whistle-
blowers, and Attorney Gage, coupled with increasingly large plaintiff awards, may be 
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indicative of an organization in need of a paradigm shift in how the act of whistle-
blowing is viewed and managed from within. 
Research Questions 
 The following research questions guided this study in the determination of how 
the act and process of whistle-blowing impacts police officer whistle-blowers, and 
whether ineffective management of the reporting of wrongdoing is a contributing factor 
in the internal whistle-blowing process. 
1. What is the reported likelihood of using each of the established internal 
misconduct reporting resources based on specific misconduct allegations? 
2. Are there differences in the reported likelihood of using internal misconduct 
reporting resources based on any specific acts of employee misconduct? 
3. What are the expressed reasons given for any misconduct reporting resources that 
are “Not Likely” to be used for reporting specific acts of employee misconduct? 
4. What are the actual and/or perceived consequences of participating in the whistle-
blowing process? 
Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations to this study (a) only one law enforcement 
organization was studied; (b) the study only examined the sworn population of the 
organization from the ranks of police officer, sergeant, detective, lieutenant, captain and 
commander only; and (c) reports of organizational wrong doing will be limited to acts 
that involve specifically selected acts of employee misconduct most commonly reported 
externally by police officers.   
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Whistle-blowing on the LAPD was explored solely from the sworn perspective, 
largely in part because of the high number of police officers identified by the department 
as being involved in what is described as protected activity: activities that include the 
reporting of law or policy violations by way of grievance, formal investigative entity or 
lawsuit.  There is empirical evidence to suggest that a high number of police officers do 
report peers for criminal wrongdoing such as corruption or abuse of power, for example.   
Significance of the Study 
 This exploratory study examined current LAPD whistle-blowing procedures and 
perceived impacts of reporting specific misconduct allegations to internal investigative 
resources to determine the differences between the (a) act of whistle-blowing, (b) 
intentional employee silence, (c) retaliation, and (d) organizational management of 
internal employee misconduct reporting. 
Whistle-blowing refers to the disclosure by organization members (former or 
current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, 
to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Miceli & Near, 1985).  
The punishment of whistle-blowers by way of organizational retaliation fosters a climate 
of non-disclosure or code of silence and has a negative impact on society that places an 
inordinate amount of trust in its police.  The City of Los Angeles has settled over $34 
million dollars in lawsuits initiated by Los Angeles Police Officer whistle-blowers.  
These whistle-blowers claimed they were the victims of organizational and social 
retaliation after they attempted to report their peers and/or supervisors for various types 
of wrongdoing, specifically to other employees.  A common theme that surfaces in all of 
these cases is employee discrimination at a time when the Los Angeles Police 
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Department is currently operating under a Federal Consent Decree due to complaints of 
racial profiling (using race/ethnicity as a basis for police detention).  Is this a coincidence, 
an indication of a culture in need of change, or has management selectively turned a 
blinds eye to the internal reporting of specific types of employee misconduct?   
  The information derived from this study would be useful in identifying the 
impact of whistle-blowing so that effective management systems may be designed to 
improve the internal whistle-blowing process, minimize and/or deter acts of workplace 
retaliation and enhance workplace standards of conduct.  It is also hoped that this study 
will advance the body of knowledge in the areas of whistle-blowing, negative impact of 
internally reporting misconduct, and ways to lessen the code of silence in the law 
enforcement profession. 
The Organization of LAPD 
 The Los Angeles Police Department also known as the LAPD, is the third largest 
policing agency in the United States.  There are only slightly over 9,000 sworn police 
officers and over 3,000 civilian or administrative personnel providing police service to a 
community that encompasses 467 square miles.  The city has twelve community areas 
representing approximately 3.9 million residents (as of 2004).  The organization itself is 
managed by a Chief of Police.   
The LAPD is structured in a formal hierarchal manner; a closed system with 
many layers of divisions, units and sections with many levels of specialized operations.  
The bureaucratic and paramilitary models came about during those times in history when 
a structure of command and control was needed to facilitate small divisions of specialized 
work   In a hierarchical organization power is distributed from the top down.  The idea of 
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the establishment of the bureaucratic model was first introduced by sociologist Weber 
(1947) as a way of eliminating managerial abuses that often lead to inefficiency.  Most of 
the characteristics of a bureaucratic organization fit quite well in any law enforcement 
organization, particularly with a well-defined hierarchy of authority, division of labor by 
functional specialization and a strong system of rules for staff.  The one drawback is that 
it creates impersonal employee relationships, particularly between management and 
members of the organization and strengthens relationships between assigned members of 
smaller specialized units.  These close bonds contribute to the development of in-
group/out-group dynamics, non-disclosure rules of conduct, and other forms of group 
norms that have the appearance of solidarity where “…one of the most respected tenets of 
the group is loyalty” (Johnson, 2005, p. 76). 
  Auten (1985) first introduced the paramilitary model of policing organizations.  
Paramilitary organizations incorporate military-like characteristics.  The very nature of 
police work and critical incident operations calls for this type of sworn personnel 
management and may not be as necessary or productive at all levels of the organization.  
Paramilitary organizations closely resemble the bureaucratic organizational model with 
the exception of the formulation of cultural police traditions such as badge ceremonies 
that may last for the life of the organization, strict adherence to uniform dress and 
appearance, a formal rank structure that is self-governing and a military terminology 
unique to the particular organization.  Similar to the bureaucratic model, interpersonal 
creativity, and impersonal relationships are for the most part not supported or encouraged 
by the top down leadership.    
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There are four geographic bureaus dividing the City of Los Angeles into 21 
geographical divisions.  There is one deputy chief for each geographical division with 
one or more commanders as “direct reports” who have functional supervision over the 
commanding officers (captain rank) of each patrol division.  Each division is run by two 
commanding officers of captain rank, three lieutenants (watch commanders) one per shift 
and at least one sergeant for every ten officers assigned to work each shift.  Each division 
has both a patrol division and a detective division.  There are approximately 200 officers 
assigned to each division.  Within this massively large structured organization are a 
number of specialized functions such as: scientific investigations, jail operations, 
property retention and booking operations, narcotics enforcement units, vice enforcement 
units, administrative operations, specialized detective units and criminal investigations 
and field law enforcement, to name a few.   
Terms and Concepts 
There are a number of key terms referenced in this study that will be defined to 
allow for a common understanding as to how they will be used in this study followed by 
a brief summary of what is currently known about these concepts. 
• Organization:  An organization is an open system of interconnected and 
interrelated parts (culture, physical and social cultures, technology) working in 
relationship to the external environment. 
• Paramilitary (operational) Organizational Structure:  An organization which 
models a military form of authority and control over employees with formal rank 




• Sworn Employee:  An employee having police officer status and powers of arrest. 
• Rank -Civil service classification and pay-grades:  The order of rank in the 
Department, as established by the Civil Service Commission. 
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 2/026) 
• Pay-grade:  The order of rank and pay-grade in the LAPD is as follows: 
 
• Chief of Police (COP).  
• Deputy Chief II (Asst Chief).  
• Deputy Chief I (Dep Chf).  
• Commander (Cmdr).  
• Captain III (Capt. III).  
• Captain II (Capt. II).  
• Captain I (Capt. I).  
• Lieutenant II (Lt. II).  
• Lieutenant I (Lt. I). 
• Detective III (Det. III).  
• Sergeant II (Sgt. II)  
• Sergeant I (Sgt. I)/Detective II (Det. II).  
• Detective I (Det. I).  
• Police Officer III+1 (PO III+1).  
• Police Officer III (PO III).  
• Police Officer II (PO II).  
• Police Officer I (PO I).  




• Department Supervisor- An employee engaged in field supervision or in general 
supervision of a section or unit. 
• Watch Commander- An employee having charge of a specific watch in a division 
or geographic Area. 
• Commanding Officer- An employee in charge of a bureau, a group, an Area, or a 
division of the Department 
• Staff Officer- An officer above the rank of captain.  
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 3/105) 
• Chain of Command:  Clearly defined lines of authority between each employee 
and the Chief of Police. 
 (LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 1/650) 
• Misconduct (employee):  Commitment of a criminal offence, neglect of duty, 
violation of department policy, rules, and/or procedures, conduct which may 
reflect unfavorably upon the employee or department.   
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 3/805.25) 
• Retaliation:  Unjustified adverse employment action taken against an employee 
due to his/her participation in a lawfully protected activity, as either a reporting 
party or witness. 
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 1/272) 
• Code of Silence:  A spoken and unspoken assurance or agreement among 
members of an organization to protect one another at all cost as an expression of 
loyalty, cohesion, and solidarity. 
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Summary of Theoretical Concepts 
  Studies of what constitutes the act of whistle-blowing, loyalty, the creation and 
impact of an organizational code of silence, and the impact of organizational retaliation, 
have all been studied from a variety of vantage points over the years.  A review of the 
academic literature suggests that organization development theories referencing 
employee loyalty to the organization remained steadfast in the 1950s through the middle 
1970s beginning with the “organizational man” theory with respect to employees whose 
expressed loyalty was to the organization and its purpose as being undivided and absolute 
(Lawrence, 1991; Leavitt, 1965; Nader, Petkas, & Blackwell, 1972).  The idea of loyalty 
conflicts began to surface in the middle 1970s when organizational theorists began to 
proclaim that employees in a free society should not be obligated or forced to restrict 
their personal loyalty to any one institution (Kerr, 1964).   
 The act of whistle-blowing is not a new phenomenon.  What is new, however, is 
how organizations and society as a whole have shifted the view and treatment of the 
organizational whistle-blower.  Research about whistle-blowing has largely focused on 
several influencing factors: (a) organizational factors such as the structure, culture, and 
climate, codes of conduct (Barnet & Cochran, 1992; Decker & Calo, 2007; Dozier & 
Miceli, 1985; Dworkin & Baucus, 1998;  Miceli & Near, 1985); (b) the individual 
whistle-blower, in terms of personality characteristics, values, belief systems, moral and 
ethical judgment development (Barnett & Cochran, 1992; Kolaska & Aldrich, 1980; 
Miceli & Near, 1988; Rothchild & Miethe, 1999); (c) loyalty conflicts (De Maria, 2008; 
Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Hacker, 1978, Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 
2005), and (d) situational causations, such as the seriousness of the wrongdoing, position 
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and influence of the whistle-blower within the organization, and ambiguity about real or 
perceived wrongdoing (Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989; Keenan, 1995; Miceli & Near, 
1984; Near, Dworkin, & Miceli, 1993).   
 While there is no manual entitled the Code of Silence in any organization, there 
are behaviors found in closed organizations where restrictive information sharing and 
intentional non-disclosure of police activities (including misconduct reporting) becomes a 
suspected activity to those outside of the organization. Many academic studies suggest 
that hierarchal organizational structures may by virtue of established compartmentalized 
groupings and strict lines of communication mechanisms restrain free upward 
communication (Glauser, 1984), and that fear of isolation by co-workers limits even the 
communication of viewpoints (Morrison & Milliken, 2003).  Studies conducted by 
Festinger in the 1950s, for example, showed that structuring groups into hierarchies 
automatically stifles communication flow by virtue of the many levels of subordinate and 
supervisory relationships (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Morrison & Milliken, 
2000).  In closed systems that are self-governing with respect to personnel policies and 
procedures and closed to outsiders, such as police, fire and military, formal, and informal 
norms develop an esprit de corps that is of a very protective nature (Rothwell & Baldwin, 
2007; Skolnick, 2002).  
Informing on one another ruins this family-like institution (Chin & Wells, 1998) 
making it extremely difficult for the whistle-blower to recover from in terms of social and 
organizational acceptance.  The possibility of being outcast from or retaliated by his/her 
fellow officers is exemplified in an officer’s intentional decision to not disclose the 
wrongdoing of the organization or a peer, even if the wrongdoing is committed to 
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him/her directly (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).  It is this type of conscious non-disclosure of 
information, of wrongdoing or employee misconduct, that is perceived by the public as a 
Code of Silence doctrine.  
 Retaliation is a form of “personal vendetta” against another.  Studies have shown 
that there is a propensity for whistle-blowers to suffer the wrath of organizational 
retaliation by way of adverse employment actions as a vendetta for taking part in 
disclosing wrongdoing and expression of disloyalty (Ewin, 1990; Rothwell & Baldwin, 
2007).  There is also evidence to suggest that whistle-blowers also receive harsh conduct 
from peers in the form of social retaliation for breaking the “thin blue line” by snitching 
on a brother or sister officer. 
Summary 
This research examines the act and impact of whistle-blowing by police officers, 
organizational whistle-blower management structures, and reported incidents of 
organizational and social retaliation which is reported to have followed the whistle-
blowing process.  Whistle-blowing and the psychological and social impact of the 
whistle-blowing process has been researched and studied since the 1960s.  Organizational 
response to whistle-blowers, the implications of subsequent backlash and other forms of 
social and organizational retaliation which often follows alongside the whistle-blowing 
process has not been studied with the same amount of vigilance as the research behind 
whistle-blower characteristics, intent, loyalty, and other values-based variables.  Most 
importantly, few studies have captured data from one specific law enforcement agency 
that has been the subject of such high monetary court settlements and monetary awards to 
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employees who chose to blow the whistle on their organization outside of the 
organization, rather than seek internal resolution. 
This quantitative study examined those variables that may influence the whistle-
blowing process and/or an employee’s refusal to report wrongdoing.  Quantitative 
methods of inquiry included a survey instrument that was disseminated to sworn 
department personnel using a random selection process stratified by gender in order to 
capture representatives of each rank.  Related theories, department policies and directives 
will also be compared and contrasted with City, State and Federal whistle-blowing and 
retaliation laws. 
By understanding the reasons why employees chose to report specific acts of 
organizational wrongdoing outside of the organization rather than internally, 
organizations can assess their current policies and procedures, and address obstacles that 
prevent the reporting and investigations of these issues.  The training of employees and 
management personnel would also be positively impacted by utilizing this information to 
assess current supervisory training and leadership development to determine whether 
there is a valid structure in place to affectively address the perception of loyalty conflicts, 
code of silence, and fear of whistle-blowing as well as incidents of workplace retaliation. 
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CHAPTER II:  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Since the 1950s, the act and impact of organizational whistle-blowing has been 
studied from several vantage points: organization environmental factors, the individual 
personality and belief systems of the whistle-blower, and situational or types and 
seriousness of the disclosures being made.   
Few studies, however, concentrate on the act or impact of disclosing wrongdoing 
within the organization and/or outside of the organization from the perspective of police 
officers who have historically held onto traditional mindsets of protecting one another 
and the organization as a whole from negative public scrutiny or embarrassment through 
the use and misuse of silence.  To effectively examine the act and impact of whistle-
blowing within the LAPD, this study began with an extensive literature review which 
focused on the makings of a paramilitary organization; its structure and culture, and the 
environmental factors that may influence the act and decision-making process leading to 
the disclosure or nondisclosure of organizational wrongdoing.   
A major element of the decision-making process for the police officer as whistle-
blower is the internal processing of loyalty conflicts and the unwritten expectation of 
protection of the organization by way of intentional silence.  Literature into the causes, 
effects, and impact of employee silence will be summarized to determine how intentional 
silence influences the whistle-blowing process.   
A number of municipal, state and federal laws protecting whistle-blowers have 
been enacted over the years to protect the whistle-blower who disclosed types of 
organizational wrongdoing that has direct implications for public policy.  Examples of 
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such disclosures include wrongdoing in the medical profession, pharmaceutical industry, 
environmental protection, and securities fraud, to name a few.  However, if municipal, 
state, and federal laws are designed to protect those who disclose organizational 
wrongdoing that directly affects public policy, who protects the organizational whistle-
blower from organization reprisal when the wrongdoing affects one individual or small 
group of individuals?  Examples of these types of wrongdoing include violations of laws 
pertaining to sexual harassment, race, sexual orientation, and other forms of 
discrimination.   
Absent protection from the organization, the whistle-blower is left to wonder 
about the consequences of his or her actions once co-workers and supervisors discover 
that there is a “rat in their midst.”  Is organizational reprisal or retaliation an automatic 
impact of whistle-blowing?  And, if so, how can the organization protect the whistle-
blower from harm’s way so as not to influence unnecessary and costly court litigation for 
failing to take appropriate action?  Is employee harassment and other forms of 
discriminatory wrongdoing in the mind and eyes of the beholder, or can wrongdoing be 
clearly defined?   For the purpose of this study, the standard used for identifying 
organizational wrongdoing will be the LAPD’s definition of employee misconduct. The 
Los Angeles Police Department Manual (LAPD, 2009) defines misconduct and violations 
of misconduct as follows: 
Employees shall be subject to disciplinary action for acts of misconduct. 
Misconduct is defined as: 
• Commission of criminal offense 
• Neglect of duty 
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• Violation(s) of Department policies, rules, or procedures 
• Conduct which may tend to reflect unfavorably upon the employee or the 
Department 
(LAPD, 2009, Section 3/805.25) 
 
The LAPD is no stranger to having dirty laundry aired to the public by police 
officers who have used a variety of external reporting entities to report wrongdoing that 
had a direct and most times negative impact on the public they serve.  Some of these 
types of wrongdoing include the over use of physical force, selective enforcement of the 
law based upon race, gender,  lifestyle differences, and other discriminatory acts related 
to law enforcement.  Once reported, the organization has the responsibility of conducting 
a thorough and unbiased investigation of each and every allegation of misconduct 
whether made by the public or from within its ranks.  The internal decision-making 
process for police officers who opt to disclose real, rumored, or perceived misconduct is 
an extremely difficult one, despite organizational policies that require the immediate 
internal reporting of such conduct by employees lest they too suffer the wrath of 
condoning the misconduct and be held equally liable for disciplinary action that could 
ultimately lead to termination. 
The literature review for this study focused primarily on those aspects of 
organization theory that provide a background for understanding paramilitary and/or 
police organizational structure, police culture development and socialization, whistle-
blowing and the impacts of whistle-blowing from the perspective of the whistle-blowing 




The Los Angeles Police Department, also known as the LAPD, has historically 
been controlled by Chiefs of Police with strong inflexible top-down management.  As 
head of the organization, the Chief of Police has the most significant influence over the 
everyday actions and quality of work life of organization members.  The effectiveness of 
patrol officers and detectives is evaluated daily not only by the organization but by the 
public they serve.  The effectiveness and efficiency of the organization is evaluated by 
many factors such as, the number of criminal suspects identified and arrested, response 
time to emergency calls, number of citizen complaints and commendations, lowered 
incidence of crime (violent or otherwise), increase or decrease of recovered property and 
other examples of evaluating productivity.   
In hierarchal subcultures, as in paramilitary organizations, there is a distinct 
emphasis on the separation of management levels or rank structure (Auten, 1985).  On the 
surface, uniformed officers and administrative personnel appear to work well as a team.  
However, the organizational unity that appears synergistic to those outside of the 
organization is actually fragmented by several distinct subcultures: sworn and civilian, 
upper management (staff officers) and middle management, supervisory and subordinate 
personnel.  Civilian and sworn personnel have experienced a history of tense 
relationships on the LAPD.  Sworn personnel are often described by civilians as being 
robotic, aloof, and arrogant and demanding when addressing civilian personnel.   
Civilian personnel are often stereotyped by sworn personnel as being mere 
clerical staff, despite the many civil service rankings represented on the department that 
has a number of civilians actually outrank sworn personnel.  A large number of civilian 
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personnel historically report feeling de-valued and unappreciated by the sworn members 
of the department.  Despite these vocalized or internalized differences, the rising number 
of LAPD corruption scandals and civil lawsuit awards, the department continues to police 
itself despite historic attempts to deflect external oversight monitoring.  Organizational 
culture can have an enormous impact on organizational performance.  The more separate 
these sub-cultures become, the easier it becomes to resolve loyalty conflicts by way of 
rationalization, blame, and avoidance. 
The Five Circles Model 
Hatch (1997) theorized in her book, Organization Theory that an organization is 
made up of the interrelationships of identified segments, which overlay and sometimes 
interpenetrate one another.  She designed what she termed as the Five Circles Model 
which depicts five spheres each labeled as culture, social structure, technology, and 
physical structure all contained within a larger circle entitled environment.  Hatch’s 
model suggests that each of these spheres or segments of the organization are contained 
in one or more of the other segments and that they interrelate with the organization’s 
environment (Hatch).  Using Hatch’s conceptual Five Circles Model as a basis for 
describing the organizational design of the Los Angeles Police Department would 
provide for a clearer understanding and analysis of the organization.  
Culture  
The culture of an organization consists of the norms, values, and beliefs that are 
taught and shared by the members of the organization (Schein, 2004).  The culture can be 
viewed and analyzed from two distinct vantage points.  At the forefront are the obvious 
physical settings, slogans, and traditional ceremonies, manner of dress and interpersonal 
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behaviors.  What are not as obvious are the underlying beliefs, values, and behaviors that 
occur when only members of that particular culture can see.  Sometimes the behaviors 
exhibited by members of organizational subcultures have little to no affect on the 
organization’s mission.  Then, there are those behaviors that can undermine what the 
organization wants to accomplish.   
One of the department’s most influential police chief who reined in the 1950s, 
believed that the LAPD should be run in a military fashion because he believed that the 
police were “living, physical symbols of authority…warriors who battled to save an 
indifferent world” (Cannon, 1997, p. 72).  And, for the most part, the department culture 
as a whole has unfortunately maintained this similar warrior mentality even today as 
evidenced by the continuous lawsuits initiated by and settled on behalf of community 
members for the use and overuse of police physical tactics over the years.   
Organizational culture reflects the history of the organization; the symbols and 
rituals created and nurtured by a group of people that are sometimes difficult to change.  
In his book, Good to Great, author Jim Collins wrote about the culture of discipline and 
the importance of putting the right people in the right jobs supporting the right values and 
focusing on those activities that fit the organization.  It is in these leadership actions that 
allow people to move the organization in the right direction because the right people are 
motivated (Collins, 2000).  The LAPD is no stranger to the concept of control and 
discipline to manage the behavior of its members.  Changing times, however, call for 
changes in personnel control mechanisms that tend to cultivate a culture of silence for 
fear of being outcast by the organization, its members, and the public. 
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The LAPD is structured within the confines of a top down formal bureaucratic 
culture.  Employees are governed by a 500 page Department Manual that describes work, 
dress, interpersonal relationships, law enforcement procedures, proper execution of 
various administrative duties, and other department related expectations.  Each member is 
expected to follow this manual to the letter and can be disciplined for any portion that is 
not adhered to.  The discipline policy for misconduct or conduct unbecoming of any 
employee who causes the embarrassment of the organization is strictly and has 
unfortunately, been held to task by members of the organization and its police union for 
selective enforcement of discipline depending on the rank and/or position of the accused 
employee.  
From the moment a police recruit officer graduates from their eight months of 
police academy training he or she is assigned to a training officer for twelve months for 
the practical application and testing of what they have learned while in the academy-with 
a slight exception.  Most, if not all, recruits have expressed stories about training officers 
who are quick to school their trainee with statements that are often the subject of 
controversy.  Examples of such advisements are to “forget what you just finished 
learning…  I’ll teach you the real way to do police work or, what is said in this car stays 
in this car…”  Many will say that this is the moment of a new officer’s first socialization 
or indoctrination into the real culture of the police environment where there are written 
and unwritten rules or norms of conduct (Conti, 2009; Johnson, 2005).  This is not to 
suggest that new police officers are all taught a wrong or inappropriate way of doing 
police work.  However, it is a common tactic used by more tenured officers to socialize 
young police academy graduates into the us versus them culture; a culture that often 
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becomes interpreted as the real world where cops put their lives on the line for one 
another and as such must “watch each other’s back” so as to be free of public and 
department management scrutiny (Conti, 2009). 
   According to social psychologist Schein (2002), there are at least three types of 
responses to this type of socialization, (a) rebellion, (b) creative individualism and, (c) 
conformity.  Civilian personnel-the second half of this organization are not similarly 
indoctrinated into the social norms of the police culture.  This lack of indoctrination or 
equal treatment causes an immediate wedge that breeds mistrust, and animosity between 
two distinct segments of the organization.  Creative individualism may be the most 
common response to working in an environment where authority and control leave 
minimal room for positive forms of creativity. 
Social and Physical Structure 
 The social and physical structures of an organization are very important when 
analyzing the behaviors of its members because the physical structure of an organization 
influences group, individual, and organizational identity in both positive and negative 
ways.  For example, employees who report to work from day to day in less than desirable 
conditions where the physical work environment is un-kept, desks, phones and other 
necessary items are broken, stained or in short demand may have a negative effect on the 
employee’s pride in where he or she works.  Low employee pride eventually has a 
domino effect on lowering professionalism and productivity.  The reverse is often true 
when the organizational structure and everything in it demonstrates organizational pride. 
The culture of an organization has been defined as, “….any social unit that has 
some kind of shared history…with the strength of that culture dependent on the length of 
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its existence, stability of membership and the emotional intensity of the actual historical 
experiences…” (Schein, 2004, p.11).  According to Schein, the true essences of culture 
are the established norms, beliefs, and assumptions that are at the core of their existence.   
A social structure refers to the relationships between people and the 
organizational departments they work in while the physical structure refers to the 
organizational layout-how offices and units are designed, geography, and design of office 
furniture and equipment (Daft, 2004). 
Technology 
Technology represents the methods used by the organization to produce goods or 
service.  This could be anything from tools, uniforms, and equipment used to conduct 
business to a method to produce a particular output (Daft, 2004). 
Organizational Design 
Within the established literature surrounding the topic of organizational design 
there were several 19th Century designs that closely resemble the working structure of 
paramilitary organizations today.  Ironically, these theoretical concepts created for 
maintaining the well oiled factories of the Industrial Age remain active and almost 
nurtured by paramilitary organizations, like the LAPD as if these were the only methods 
for sustaining successful organizational goals.   
 Here is a description of those theories in common with a paramilitary 
organization particularly when it comes to efficiency, organizational functioning, and 




In the 1900s, Taylor (1911) with his Scientific Management Theory theorized that 
decisions about organizations and job design should be based on the precise scientific 
study of individual situations through the close supervision of employees doing 
specialized work and motivating workers with rewards and threats of punishment, 
including loss of employment.  Taylor’s theory introduced strong arguments for 
management control over employees since at the time of its design workers were viewed 
as selectively doing work to allow for more workers to be hired.  Taylor also designed 
incentives for workers-a method for increasing productivity.  In fact, if Taylor were 
running a police department today he would probably be using information technology to 
insure that officers and supervisors were targeting enforcement activities in the right 
direction (Daft, 2004).  Today, police officers are evaluated by numbers: the number of 
citations and reports written, number of arrests made by personal observations of criminal 
activity as compared to radio call response, number of calls handled and the time it took 
to respond to those calls, and other numerical comparisons of lesser importance.  This 
method of evaluation for determining an officer’s effectiveness can either work as a 
reward for good work or a counseling session for the necessity of improved performance.  
To a select few, it translates as selective acknowledgment based on favoritism and bias; 
another reason to “take care of each other.” 
Organizational Functioning  
 In 1917, Fayol (as cited in Daft, 2004) with his Administrative Principles looked 
at the design of organizations by introducing fourteen principles of management as a 
means for looking at the function of the organization as a whole, not just the workers on 
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the assembly line as with Fayol.  Two principles in particular continue to be utilized in 
bureaucratic organizations today with the LAPD as no exception: Unity of Command and 
Unity of Direction.  Unity of Command suggests that subordinates should only take 
direction from one supervisor.  Unity of Direction suggests that similar activities 
conducted within an organization should be grouped under one manager’s control (Fayol, 
as cited in Daft, 2004). 
Clearly Defined Authority and Control 
 The bureaucratic framework of organizations was created out of the need to help 
organizations maintain maximum efficiency in operations and is also known as the 
classical perspective.  The desire to have a well oiled functioning organization came 
about with the classic model of sociologist Max Weber in 1947.  Daft (2004) identified 
several characteristics that he theorized would be found in a successful bureaucracy. 
1. Rules and Procedures 
2. Specialization and division of labor 
3. Hierarchy of authority 
4. Technically qualified personnel 
5. Separate position and incumbent 
6. Written communications and records 
The LAPD continues to manage its operations using principles and theories that were 
much more effective within the timeframe and society structure they were designed in 
than they are today.  The changing society and workforce demographics demonstrate a 
significant need for ongoing organizational change in all industries both public and 
private.  All of the LAPD rules and procedures are codified in a department manual that 
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is distributed to all employees and their receiving this document is acknowledged with 
signatures that are filed away only to resurface when those policies are not appropriately 
followed.  By definition, employee misconduct can be a rude comment as well as a 
violation of criminal law.  How this definition is applied varies from supervisor to 
supervisor.   
In a study conducted on the LAPD’s command and control system, the 
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (Christopher 
Commission), appointed by Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley in 1991 and headed by the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, described the LAPD’s system as “outdated.”  
It went on to say that this type of system not only fails to broaden the goals of crime 
prevention, it “…fostered the retaliation machinery, and alienated rank and file as well as 
the public” (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department 
[Christopher Commission], 1991).  Attempts to overturn, question, or dismiss orders and 
other management decisions are often viewed as acts of insubordination and are 
considered threatening to the orderly procedures required to operate (Glazer & Glazer, 
1989) in an efficient manner. 
Sub-culture separation, the application of discipline, selection of personnel for 
specialized training and assignments, evaluating work performance, and other workplace 
actions fall under close scrutiny by all members of the organization, not just supervisors 
and upper command staff.  News of special treatment given to command staff or 
supervisory personnel when misconduct is reported travels through the organization 
within a 24-hour period.  To a select few, the message translates to separate sets of rules 
and an environment riddled with favoritism and selective enforcement of the rules; a 
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perfect breeding ground for the unwritten code to  “watch each other’s back…stick 
together…what goes on in this car stays in this car.”  Police officers perceive the LAPD 
discipline system  “as an arbitrary, demeaning system of entrapments that burns 
whistleblowers, fails to stop big abuses” of power (Chemerinsky, 2001, p. 566), yet 
“prosecutes officers for ‘micro-infractions’” (p. 566); a system designed to treat officers 
like “targets of control” (p. 575) where silence is employed to protect officers from the 
discipline system that is viewed as “petty and unfair” (p. 575). 
There are two characteristics of the police culture that are more pervasive than 
others are:  isolation and solidarity.  Policing can be a highly stressful, scrutinized, and 
secretive profession.  Officers police the community with an inordinate degree of power 
and authority.  Separation and isolation from the community, a strict and unforgiving 
internal discipline system that demands the immediate reporting of misconduct through a 
relentless chain of command, and the inherent dangers of police work, leads officers to 
stick together (Kleinig, 1996; Wright, 1999) and may also contribute to organizational 
silencing or an unwritten code of silence.  In this environment, the reporting of 
wrongdoing by the organization is viewed as an act of self serving disloyalty whether the 
wrongdoing is reported through internal channels or reported to an external resource.   
The police culture can be as distrusting internally within their own community as they are 
of the outside (community): a closed culture that easily mirrors a dysfunctional family 
system when they begin to abuse and emotionally cannibalize their own employees in the 
guise of maintaining tradition, silence (keeping dirty laundry at home), and blind loyalty.     
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Code of Silence 
 The code of silence as an intentional silencing of the reporting of misconduct or 
wrong-doing, is not a new phenomenon.  Other professions such as the medical and 
judicial industries have been known to intentionally withhold information that would 
cause the embarrassment, discipline, or termination of individuals or complete 
organizations.  However, police silencing, also known as the blue code or the code of 
silence, seems to get the most attention from the community when it involves law 
enforcement officers who cover up, refuse to disclose, or testify against a fellow officer 
for violations of criminal misconduct.  The covering up of administrative misconduct 
falls within the scope of internal investigative entities, which monitor the organization 
from within for the maintenance of professional standards and adherence to departmental 
policies and procedures.  LAPD Manual sections will be used in this study to qualify 
what will be referenced as misconduct.  Studies into the code of silence indicate that this 
phenomenon may be an “embedded feature of police culture” that has potentially 
corrosive and destructive elements (Kleinig, 2001; Skolnick, 2002).  Surveys distributed 
to police officers indicate that this intentional silencing occurs in all ranks and in all 
departments and that many officers chose not to report misconduct for fear of what my 
happen to them or what may not happen to the person they report on (Trautman, 2001).  
 Several studies have been conducted on the LAPD following large organizational 
scandals such as the infamous Rampart Scandal where a Rampart Division gang 
enforcement officer implicated 70 officers for illegal conduct ranging from shootings, 
bribery, and perjury after he himself was implicated (see Independent Review Panel, 
2000; LAPD, 2000; Reese, 2002).  This reported activity resulted in over $90 million s in 
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civil court settlements.  Studies consistently reveal that the culture of silence on the 
LAPD has not been properly addressed (see Chemerinsky, 2001; Independent 
Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991; Independent Review Panel, 
2000; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  This may be because it is so engrained in the culture 
of the LAPD that few accept this concept as a true fact when in fact there has been 
testimony given by two top LAPD officials who provided testimony to the Christopher 
Commission in 1991 indicating that the culture of LAPD needed serious reform.  These 
high ranking officials were blasted by then Chief Darryl Gates for having “sold out the 
department” (Chemerinsky, 2001, p. 562). They “sold out” the department by admitting 
the LAPD needed reform.  If high ranking officials are viewed this way, what is to be 
said of the lower ranks of the organization when they come forward? 
Studies conducted on police agencies from throughout the United States indicate 
that the majority of police officers would not report incidents of misconduct that were 
viewed as being minor in nature (see U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 1993; 2008).  
Criminal actions committed by police officers; however, were more likely to be reported 
and viewed more serious than administrative infractions which are viewed as minor acts 
of misconduct that do not warrant disclosure (Westmarland, 2005).  If the perceived 
seriousness of the misconduct is a strong determinant of whether an officer would report 
the wrongdoing or not, this may be an indicator of why victim police officers of internal 
violations of laws or organizational policies relating to discrimination or harassment are 
more unlikely to report or blow the whistle on these types of misconduct.  The decision to 
internally report misconduct is a difficult process for police officers.  They face fears that 
can range from not being believed to being ostracized and/or socially removed from the 
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close work environment they considered as close or closer to their own family.  In August 
2000 a total of 40 LAPD officers filed a class action lawsuit against the LAPD for 
enforcing a code of silence and in allowing management the power of retaliating against 
those who came forward with misconduct (Lait & Glover, 2000).  This significant 
number of officers is very telling in and of itself. 
Whistle-Blowing 
The act of whistle-blowing is not a new phenomenon.  Research into the topic of 
whistle-blowing has largely focused on several influencing factors: (a) organizational 
factors such as the structure, culture and climate, codes of conduct (Miceli & Near, 
1985); (b) the individual whistle-blower, in terms of personality characteristics, values, 
belief systems, moral and ethical judgment development (Chiu, 2003; Miceli & Near, 
1988; Rothchild & Miethe, 1999); (c) situational causations, such as the seriousness of 
the wrongdoing, position and influence of the whistle-blower within the organization; and 
(d) ambiguity about real or perceived wrongdoing (Keenan, 2000, Miceli & Near, 1984).     
 In the 1980s the act of whistle-blowing began to be studied from sociological and 
psychological perspectives to identify what organizational conditions most affected the 
growing incidents of employee dissent.  Was it authority structure, lines of 
communication, top down decision-making processes, or a combination of all?  And, in 
what way do these organizational processes affect what appeared to be a growing 
dilemma of conflicting loyalties and employee dissent (Anderson, Perrucci, Schendel, & 
Trachtman, 1980; Stewart, 1980).  The affects of whistle-blowing once studied from a 
narrow organizational perspective began to focus primarily on the characteristics and 
identification of the typical whistle-blower in the middle to late 1980s.  Many studies 
35 
 
focused on whether whistle-blowers be identified by a shared belief system and/or do 
organizational ethical climates influence the likelihood of their willingness to blow the 
whistle on their organization (Miceli & Near, 1984).   
As organizational theories shifted with respect to the act and propensity for 
whistle-blowing so did the definitions of what the term whistle-blowing actually meant.  
The term whistle-blowing comes from the combination of the words blow and whistle.  
The common analogy of using a whistle to stop a train is similarly used to describe the 
act of whistle-blowing; implying that someone is blowing the whistle on a person or 
organization to stop something from happening (Miceli & Near, 1985).  According to 
Craige and Hubert (as cited in Vandekercklove, 2006); however, the word blow was 
actually a slang term used in 1839 to describe the act of informing while the symbolic use 
of the word whistle may have been derived from as far back as 1599 when the term was 
used to describe an informer (Simpson & Weiner, 1989). 
There is some uniformity in how the term whistle-blower is used and referenced 
as a form of behavior as in the “act” of whistle-blowing.  What is somewhat conflicting is 
how the various theorists describe a whistle-blower and the conditions that lay the 
foundation for whistle-blowing to occur.  For example, in 1972, the whistle-blower and 
act of whistle-blowing was described as a man or woman who blew the whistle on an 
organization for acts he/she believed were corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful to the 
public interest (Nader et al., 1972).  The 1970s symbolized change from absolute loyalty 
to an organization to social resistance to organizational authority.  It stands to reason why 
this particular definition was quite clear in referencing organizational corruption as being 
harmful to public interest and therefore deserving of the proverbial whistle being blown 
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outside of the organization.  In 1995, the definition was expanded somewhat to include 
internal whistle-blowing as a valid qualifier to describe the act of whistle-blowing 
(Chiasson, Johnson, & Byington, 1995).   
Whistle-blowing was described by an organizational theorist as being a socially 
useful act of informing; a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure made by a person 
with access to data who reports any wrongdoing to an external entity who has the 
potential to rectify the wrongdoing.   In his book, Vandekerckhove (2006) noted that the 
act of whistle-blowing was described by Jubb (1999) as having six elements in the 
whistle-blowing process: an action, an outcome, an actor, the subject, the target (of the 
wrong-doing), and the recipient.  He also recognized the element of motive (De Maria, 
1994) as a seventh element of the whistle-blowing process. 
When the wrongdoing is reported to an entity or person within the organization, 
the whistle-blowing is described as being an internal reporting process.  When the 
wrong-doing is reported to persons or entities outside of the organization, such as the 
media or by way of a civil lawsuit, the whistle-blowing is considered an external 
reporting process (Hoffman, 2001). 
There does not appear to be any uniformity as to whether the act of reportable 
wrongdoing through the organization’s outlined internal reporting structure constitutes 
whistle-blowing or whether the whistle-blower must report the wrongdoing through an 
entity that is outside of the organization to be considered a true whistle-blower.  
Chiaisson et al. (1995) opine that internal disclosure does qualify as whistle-blowing 
while Miceli and Near (1992) claim there is an important distinction to be made between 
internal and external disclosure of wrong-doing because in their studies on whistle-
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blowing internal disclosure commonly precedes external disclosure.  This distinction is 
important because there are State and Federal statutes that specifically protect whistle-
blowers from retaliation when they use internal channels such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX), and others who are protected when reporting to external channels.   
What is also unclear in academic literature is whether an internal reporting source 
within an organization in a position to rectify the wrong-doing can equally be viewed as a 
whistle-blower if the reporting whistle-blower is referred to external resources for 
resolving the organizational wrong-doing being reported.  According to Vandekerckhove 
(2006), internal disclosure (of wrongdoing) can follow conventional hierarchical lines of 
authority or they can thwart those lines.  Interestingly, the literature suggests that both 
internal and external whistle-blowers tend to view their organizations as unsupportive 
and having less than effective avenues for resolving complaints of wrong-doing (Near, 
Rehg, Van Scotter & Miceli, 2004; Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2004).  An 
organization that provides adequate responses to internal reports of wrongdoing must be 
recognized as a key factor in avoiding external reporting (Andrews, 2006; Miceli & Near, 
1994).   
Paramilitary organizations, not unlike many other public corporations where a 
good reputation equates to efficiency, the reporting of wrongdoing whether externally or 
internally is viewed as an act of being disloyal to the organization and at times, the 
profession itself.  In a sense, the whistle-blower becomes the “enemy within” (Davis, 
1989, p. 8).  When organizations respond negatively, ineffectively, or completely fail to 
respond to reports of organizational wrongdoing, these responses break relationships of 
trust between the whistle-blower and the organization.  They create loyalty conflicts that 
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cause future whistle-blowers to remain silent or seek resolution outside of the 
organization for a more acceptable recourse of action (Larmer, 1992; Sims & Keenan, 
1998; Varelius, 2008; Zhang, Chiu, & Li-Qun, 2009). 
Stages of the Whistle-Blowing Process 
 A “typical” whistle-blowing process that occurs one exact way under an exact set 
of circumstances has not been and may not ever be established.  The act of whistle-
blowing is not an exact science.  Each whistle-blower utilizes his or her individual 
decision-making process or way of internally processing how, when and to whom any 
real or perceived wrongdoing should be reported.  Prior personal experience or the 
rumored experiences of other whistle-blowers also contribute to what if anything may be 
reported within the organization, particularly if the experience was a negative one.  
The act of whistle-blowing appears to follow an individualistic decision-making process 
that goes through a number of stages (Miceli & Near, 1992).   
 According Miceli and Near (1992), there are very distinct stages that are involved 
in the whistle-blowing process with each stage having a number of distinct 
characteristics: (a) individual characteristics that affect his or her approach to the whistle-
blowing issue; (b) the situation, content, and process of the issue, (c) the organization 
involved in the reported wrongdoing; (d) the relative power of the parties over one 
another; and (e) assessment of the outcome.  Studies conducted by Miceli and Near 
(1984, 1985), indicate that following a reportable event (stage one), there are at least five 
stages in the whistle-blowing process.  Figure 1 illustrates the five stages of the whistle-
blowing process as it would function on the LAPD.  The five stages are 
1. The triggering event  
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2. The pre whistle-blowing decision of who and where to report 
3. The decision to report or not report the event 
4. Members of whistle-blowers work group and organization reactions if and 
when they are aware of the complaint and identity of whistle-blower 
5. Whistle-blower assessment of the outcome of reported issue 
Triggering Event
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Figure 1. Reporting misconduct on the Los Angeles Police Department within the five-




Consequences and Impact of Whistle-blowing Process 
 How the organization and its members respond to a whistle-blowing event 
varies.  Much of the research into the consequences and impact of whistle-blowing from 
the organizations perspective indicate that there are both short term and long term 
responses to whistle-blowing whether the disclosure is made internally or externally.  
From an organizational perspective, in the short term the wrongdoing may discontinue 
immediately or it may continue on as if nothing were reported. 
Either of these actions in the long term can result in a change in organizational 
policy.  From the whistle-blowers perspective, the short term effects can be the 
experiencing of organizational retaliation (at all levels), or no response to the disclosure.  
In the long term, there may be continuous negative organizational outcomes such as 
adverse employment actions or the experience of backlash, ostracism or being put in 
harms way by affected or unaffected co-workers who band together to avenge the breach 
of disloyalty.  Loyalty, according to the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, is 
the “willingness to sacrifice…” (Axinn, 1977, pp. 388-389). 
Loyalty and Intrinsic Controls 
Another way of looking at this form of sacrifice is to understand that to be loyal 
more closely means to be “true to one’s obligations” (Vandekercklove, 2006).  The 
question is how one defines his or her highest obligation (Kolaska & Aldrith, 1980).  
New York Patrolman Frank Serpico was true to his highest obligation: his profession 
when he refused to be a part of receiving bribes from citizens and criminals in the middle 
1960s (Reese, 2002).  Yet, others from within the same organization classified him as a 
disloyal “rat” who took away everyone’s livelihood after he disclosed their corrupt deeds.  
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They were police officers who took the same oath of office as Serpico.  Where did their 
initial loyalties lie and what caused this transformation from protection of the public to 
taking from the public?  
Intrinsic controls are used in the police culture to produce conformity without the 
need for the confines of strict rules and regulations.  The idea is to produce voluntary 
conformity by instilling in each officer a common intrinsic belief system of pride and 
professionalism with the demand for organizational unity, and loyalty to the law 
enforcement profession thereby doing away for the need of constant monitoring.  
“Loyalty is a significant element of intrinsic control” (Reese, 2002, p. 107).  There are 
formal intrinsic controls given by the establishment of authority and control mechanism 
and there are informal intrinsic controls set by the unwritten rules of small groups within 
the organization.   
 In 1969, New York Police Officer Frank Serpico learned about such intrinsic 
control mechanisms fairly quickly when he joined a police department that was riddled 
with racism, graft and many other forms of corruption.  He had such a respect for the law 
enforcement profession that he was quickly socialized into the department’s social 
structure.  In time however he learned about the informal social intrinsic cultural norms 
of acceptance of bribes, evidence tampering and other criminal cover-ups involving a 
large segment of the police department.  He resisted these informal intrinsic controls and 
it almost cost him his life.  Officer Serpico went to great lengths to report the misconduct 
internally and then externally to the media.  Changes were made many years later.  
Indictments were served to over half of the personnel from all levels of the organization.  
Just weeks after receiving a hero’s thank you, Frank Serpico responded to a planned drug 
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raid and was shot in the face at point blank range while his partners turned a blind eye.  
Serpico retired from the force with a disability pension (Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Reese, 
2002).  If there was one question to be asked of Officer Serpico it would be this, was it all 
worth it? 
 Whistle-blowing is motivated by a variety of personal interests.  While one 
whistle-blower may claim the overarching goal of betterment of the organization, another 
may seek to avenge the wrongs he or she may have experienced or witnessed as a 
significant breach of organizational trust (Callahan & Collins, 1992; Cortina & Magley, 
2003; De Maria, 2008; Sims, 1998).  While many superiors look at whistle-blowing as a 
form of personal revenge, retaliation is a part of a rational and planned process initiated 
by an organization to destroy the resister’s credibility as a witness (Parmerlee, Near, & 
Jensen, 1982).   
Retaliation 
 Retaliation or “getting even” has been identified as one of several impacts related 
to the whistle-blowing process.  The reporting of organizational retaliatory practices are 
not always met with welcome arms.  In fact, retaliation has almost become an expected 
outcome of reporting organizational misconduct (Beard, 2007; Benoit & Nagle, 2003; 
Yaffe, 2007).  Retaliation can range from coercion by organizational members to 
withdraw a complaint or not participate in a criminal or administrative investigation 
involving another employee to outright exclusion from the organization with behaviors, 
such as isolation, character assassination or defamation, elimination of job position, 
demotions, transfers, and other forms of harassment and/or discrimination (Cancino & 
Enriquez, 2004; Near & Miceli, 1986, 2008; Parmerlee et al., 1982).  Studies have shown 
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that supervisors who retaliate often do so to avenge their reported or suspected inability 
to maintain order and control within their places of assignment (O’Day, 1974; Patel, 
2003; Schreiber & Marshall, 2006; Sheeder, 2006).  Other members of the organization 
view outside disclosures of wrongdoing as a breach of organizational loyalty; the acts of 
disgruntled troublemakers who have done nothing more than embarrass the leadership of 
the LAPD.  Rather than allow outsiders to question the decision making policies of an 
organization most managers quickly attack the whistle-blowers credibility, particularly if 
the charges are serious, in hope of diverting unwanted questions (Alford, 2007; 
Anderson, 2009; Glazer & Glazer, 1989). 
 Many researchers have studied levels of retaliation to determine whether specific 
actions taken by the whistle-blower may have influenced various forms of retaliation, if 
the channel chosen to report the wrongdoing influenced the type of retaliation received, 
or if the disclosure of the identity of the whistle-blower caused any forms of retaliatory 
behaviors (Birk, 2006; Miceli & Near, 1984, 1992,1994, 2002; Near & Miceli, 1986; 
Parmerlee et al., 1982).  Their conclusions vary.  In fact, very few of these studies 
included research into the impact caused to the organization when the disclosure of 
wrongdoing is made by a police officer from within the rank and file who did not leave 
the organization after being reportedly retaliated against, as in the case of Frank Serpico.  
Studies have been conducted with police officers and their decision to remain silent in 
lieu of reporting misconduct and the variables that influenced their decisions to report or 
not report (Olson-Buchanan & Boswell, 2002).  Past studies have shown that few 
resisters are prepared for what follows their reports of wrongdoing.  While many whistle-
blowers claim that their “principles commanded their loyalty far more strongly than did 
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management” managers continue to view the actions of whistle-blowers as an act of 
disloyal undermining.  Whistle-blowers are viewed by management as having involved 
themselves in “actions against the very bureaucratic hierarchy that hired them and 
provided good salaries” within a highly respected profession (Glazer & Glazer, 1989).   
 Studies have shown that management has taken a number of steps to silent the 
whistle-blower from further organizational embarrassment.  Some of these steps include 
blacklisting, transfers to positions outside of their normal expertise or assigned tasks well 
below their level of competence, demoted, or harassed by co-workers and supervisors, 
“which far exceed the ostensible provocation” (Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p. 134).  
Indications of these whistle-blowing impacts appear to be loud and clear on the LAPD.  
The Office of the Inspector General was designed as a means to end the suspected code 
of silence by allowing officers to speak to another independent resource for reporting 
wrongdoing under strict confidentiality and protection from reprisal.  In their report of the 
Rampart Scandal, it was noted that LAPD had revealed confidentially that they had 
received reprisals from the department and supervisors after reporting wrongdoing.  They 
reported being branded as “disloyal”, being transferred to less desirable assignments and 
often to less convenient distances from home; also known as “freeway therapy” 
(Chemerinsky, 2001, p. 545). 
 It is the intent of this study to explore whistle-blower actions and the actual or 
perceived retaliation negative consequences reported by police officers who work on the 
LAPD in hopes of advancing current studies involving the act and impact of whistle-
blowing and improve on current policies and procedures for recognizing and improving 
behaviors associated with perceived retaliation following the reporting of wrongdoing.   
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Managers, particularly in police organizations, often ask whether employee perceptions 
absent hard facts, should be given equal investigative attention as employees who report 
quantifiable adverse employment actions.  A recent report completed by the U.S. Merit 
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) in 2008 addressed this common concern after 
conducting a report on 25 years of perspectives of the Merit Principles Survey: 
Perceptions matter, because negative perceptions-even when unwarranted- can 
seriously undermine morale, organizational performance, and the credibility and 
effectiveness of even well-intentioned, well-conceived management initiatives. (p. 
55) 
 The Board of Inquiry Report (Los Angeles Police Department, 2000) on the 
LAPD indicated there was no need to do a cultural overhaul of the LAPD after a study 
was completed on the LAPD’s use of force following the Rodney King incident in 1991 
when he was beat by three LAPD officers while 11 others watched.  They concluded that 
the removal of a few rotten apples and stamping out organizational mediocrity were 
sufficient to maintain order on the LAPD (Chemerinsky, 2001).  To this, I quote authors 
Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) who said: 
It is far easier for police chiefs to blame misconduct on individual “rotten apples” 
than to admit they have (a culture)…that systematically turns new members into 
wrongdoers…lasting reform is not imposed by the personal charisma of a single 
chief…or by replacing wrongdoers with fresh blood. (p. 186) 
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Legal Approaches to Whistle-Blowing 
State and Federal Laws 
 The focus of federal and state laws having to do with whistle-blowing has 
predominantly been the protection of employee whistle-blowers from organizational 
retaliation and to compensate them when it has been proven legally that they have 
suffered adverse employment actions as a direct result of their whistle-blowing.  Since 
retaliation is not an automatic response in all whistle-blowing case, the fears associated 
with possible retaliation absent evidence of adverse employment decisions or actions that 
inhibit the employee’s ability to function at work and/or home stress free is virtually  
detectable without substantiated proof.  The whistle-blower is protected by law only after 
the retaliation occurs (Miceli & Near, 1992).  Life threatening fears experienced by 
police officers can be a huge deterrent to disclosing any form of misconduct or whistle-
blowing. The effectiveness of the internal reporting system in place currently could either 
encourage or discourage disclosure of wrongdoing.  Current laws are viewed as 
ineffective in correcting and preventing organizational misconduct (Miceli & Near). 
 Several of the most common federal and state statutes relating to whistle-blowers 
will now be summarized. 
Federal 
The federal government’s goal in enacting legislation protecting whistle-blowers 
was to reduce federal fraud, waste, and abuse by encouraging the reporting of 
wrongdoing. Whistle-blower protection statutes began to surface in the 1980s. 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The National Labor Relations Act 
protects employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activities with or without a 
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union.  The act also attempts to improve working conditions, such as wages and benefits 
(National Labor Relations Act, 1935). 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.  The Civil Service Reform Act prohibited 
retaliation against any Federal employee who disclosed illegal or wasteful activities 
(Civil Service Reform Act, 1978).  The act also established the U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB), which conducts periodic studies of the federal civil service 
system and reports to the President and Congress about the progress of the protections in 
place for prohibited personnel practices.  The MSPB has conducted several studies of 
whistle-blowing and retaliation through the use of anonymous survey instruments.   
 False Claims Act of 1863 (revised in 1986). One of the most popular whistle-
blower statutes is the False Claims Act of 1863 and revised in 1986 makes recoveries for 
victims of retaliation much more generous and easier to obtain.  Under this act, the 
whistle-blower files a qui tam (Latin phrase meaning “he who sues for the king as well as 
for himself”) suit on behalf of the government (Miceli & Near, 1992, p. 247).  The Justice 
Department can either join the suit or not.  If they join the suite and the case is successful, 
the whistle-blower receives up to 25% of the judgment.  If the government does not join 
and the case is successful, the whistle-blower receives 30% of the judgment (Federal 
False Claims Act, 1986).  
Whistle-Blower Protection Act of 1989. The Whistle-blower Protection Act was 
passed by congress in 1989 to strengthen the protections for whistle-blowers by 
improving the appeals process (Whistle-Blower Protection Act, 1989). 
Notification and Federal Anti-Discrimination Act of 2002.  On May 15, 2002, 
President Bush signed legislation called the NO FEAR Act (Notification and Federal 
48 
 
Anti-Discrimination Act, 2002) to improve agency accountability for antidiscrimination 
and whistle-blower laws.  The law requires employers to be notified of their rights under 
discrimination laws and the Whistle-blower Protection Act.  This law holds federal 
agencies accountable for violations of antidiscrimination and whistle-blower protection 
laws. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (revised in 2006). In 2006 the Supreme Court lowered 
the threshold for proving adverse employment actions in retaliation claims under Title 
VII (Civil Rights Act, 1964).  Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and any action by an employer that could 
dissuade a reasonable worker form making or supporting a charge of discrimination 
(Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. V. White, 1962). 
State of California 
 California Government Code 12940. The California Government Code 12940(h) 
in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act of 1980 in the makes it unlawful for 
an employer, or person to discriminate against any person because he/she opposed 
practices forbidden under Section 12940(j) (1).  The employer and individuals who 
pursue such harassment or retaliation (such as threatening to take disciplinary action 
against employees who have filed claims of discrimination, harassment or retaliation may 
be held personally liable under California Government Code Section 12940(j) (3). 
 California Labor Code Section 232.5. The California Labor Code Section 232.5 
makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge, formally discipline, or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee who discloses information about the employer’s 
working conditions.  
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 California Labor Code Section 1102.5. The California Labor Code Section 
1102.5 protects employees who refuse to participate in an activity that would result in a 
violation of a state or federal statue, or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or 
regulation.  An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing 
information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has 
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal 
statute, or a violation of noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation 
(California Department of Industrial Relations, 2010). 
City of Los Angeles 
Los Angeles City Employees 
 The Los Angeles City Ethics Commission was established in 1990.  The City 
Charter has mandated that the Commission maintain a 24-hour Whistle-blower Hotline so 
that City employees can anonymously report alleged violations of City laws under the 
Commission’s jurisdiction without fear of retaliation from supervisors or other 
individuals (Los Angeles City Ethics Commission Newsletter, 2006). 
Los Angeles Municipal Code, Section 49.5.4 protects city employees from 
retaliation such as suspension, termination, demotion, an unfair increase in workload, or 
transfer to another office so far that the commute presents a hardship for the individual, 
and any other form of discriminatory conduct in retaliation for a subordinate filing a 
whistle-blower complaint (City of Los Angeles, 2010). 
Los Angeles Police Officers 
With respect to police officers, there are specific Administrative Codes, 
Government Codes, Memorandum of Understanding, Civil Service Codes, and the Police 
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Officers Bill of Rights, which all govern the terms and conditions of employment 
specifically for public service employees.  The following codes will be briefly 
summarized in relation to police officer grievances with respect to administrative 
transfers, and re-assignments to a lowered pay-grade.  These types of grievances are the 
most common reasons for retaliation claims made by police officers. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU between the City of Los 
Angeles, LAPD, and Los Angeles Protective League governs the terms and conditions of 
employment actions made with respect to LAPD police officers of the rank of lieutenant 
and below.  According to Article 1.8(8) of the MOU, the Chief of Police has the authority 
to transfer and Assign members of the department as needed.  Transfers may not be 
grieved and are not subject to arbitration regardless of the reason for the transfer.  Article 
8.1(a) of the MOU defines a grievance as a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the MOU or department rules and regulations governing personnel 
practices or working conditions (Los Angeles Police Protective League, 2009). 
The Los Angeles Administrative Code. The Los Angeles Administrative Code also 
provides that employees may not raise grievances about the consequences of 
management decisions on wage, hours and other terms and conditions of employment 
(Los Angeles Charter and Administrative Code, 1969-2010).  
The Los Angeles Police Department Manual. The LAPD Manual, Section 763.55, 
provides the circumstances when re-assignment to a lower pay-grade is warranted and 
indicates that an officer who has clearly demonstrated his/her failure to satisfactorily 
perform the duties of his/her current position may be re-assigned.  The officer is given 
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30-days to respond before the paperwork is submitted to the Employee Relations Group 
commanding officer for review and approval (LAPD, 2009). 
LAPD Internal Investigative Resources 
 There are a number of internal investigative resources within the LAPD that have 
a specific duty to manage, refer or outsource, and/or investigate any allegation of 
misconduct, including allegations of retaliation.  Department employees may meet with 
any one or more of these entities for the purpose of bringing misconduct to the attention 
of department. (LAPD, 2009): 
1. Any department supervisor 
Any department supervisor, sworn or civilian may initiate a formal personnel 
complaint reporting, refer to another investigative entity, or conduct a formal 
investigation. 
2. Internal Affairs Group 
Internal Affairs Group is made up of investigators skilled in the investigation of 
personnel complaint investigations initiated by employees or the public.  Upon 
notification of a personnel complaint against the department, or another 
department employee, the receiver of this investigation will document the 
complaint and a Complaint File number will be assigned in order to tract the 
complaint to fruition.   
3. Work Environment Liaison Division  
Assigned WELD personnel are skilled in alternative dispute resolutions that 
include mediation, conciliation and or referrals to other investigative resources.  
Should a formal personnel complaint investigation be deemed necessary, WELD 
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personnel will forward the employee’s interview information to the appropriate 
investigative entity or to the employee’s commanding officer for review and 
action.  Typical cases involve hostile treatment by co-workers and supervisors and 
other inter-personal conflicts. 
4. Employee Relations Group 
The entity is responsible for managing grievances filed by department personnel 
that are related to employment actions.  Wage, hour, shift assignments and 
transfers are typical grievances filed by personnel. 
5. Behavioral Science Services 
Department psychologists are provided with strict levels of confidentiality 
privileges. Absent a claim of harm to self or others, child, elder or other abuse 
violations that must be reported, department psychologists have doctor/patient 
privileges of non-disclosure. 
6. Peer Support Personnel 
Peer Support Personnel are trained department personnel who voluntarily assist 
employees who are in personal or professional crisis and need of referral 
resources. 
7.  Office of the Inspector General 
Appointed by the Los Angeles Police Commission to monitor the activities of the 
LAPD and may assist in the resolution of reported wrongdoing. 
8.  Los Angeles Police Protective League 
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LAPD union representatives voted into office by LAPD members.  Union 
representatives may assist members in resolving reported employment concerns 
or complaints by meeting with involved department commanding officers. 
9.  Retaliation Prevention Unit, Risk Management Group 
Unit assigned to monitor employment actions taken against employees who are 
involved in protected activity to ensure there is no evidence of retaliation. 
Summary 
For the purpose of this study, the act of whistle-blowing has been defined as, a 
process utilized by an individual employee or group of individuals who decide or 
conspire to inform about real or perceived organizational wrongdoing to an entity within 
the organization or outside of the organization.  The organization studied as we explore 
the act and impact of whistle-blowing is the LAPD.  The sources of the whistle-blowers 
are the police officer employees of the LAPD.  There have been a number of empirical 
studies having to do with the act of whistle-blowing.  The impact or consequences of 
whistle-blowing to the organization being reported or to the individual whistle-blower 
have yielded mixed results.  Like an open wound, whistle-blowing can be effective when 
the disclosure results in needed change to the infected organization.  Conversely, the act 
of whistle-blowing can also be used to purposefully hurt the organization when the 
disclosure is only intended to be a self-serving act of vengeance, retribution, or scape-
goating rather than generating needed change.  When used for these purposes, whistle-
blowing can still impact the organization in a positive way from the outside in through 
media, outside organizations or by public demand. 
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 Police officers are socialized into their profession differently than most other 
professions.  There is a need for unity of command and unity of loyalty to the profession 
in order to continue to protect and serve the community with utmost professionalism and 
integrity.  To maintain this level of loyalty it is vitally important that we understand 
breaches of loyalty by putting systems in place to identify organizational wrongdoing by 
encouraging and even rewarding internal whistle-blowing.  An officer’s highest level of 
loyalty is to his or her profession; the badge he or she wears every day is the symbol of 
trust imposed upon them by the public.   
The next level of loyalty is to the specific law enforcement organization they are 
employed by.  Should that level of loyalty be breached by ineffective, illegal, unethical or 
immoral methods of supervision, the decision to right that wrongdoing becomes a process 
that is an individual sacrifice of self?  Once the decision is made to blow the whistle 
internally, the organization that fails to act or that acts inappropriately sets the stage for 
the external disclosure of wrongdoing.  It is at this moment that the organization stands 
on trial by the public and its members for the proper resolution of reported wrongdoings.  
 The LAPD has historically managed strict reporting policies for reporting 
misconduct.  Policies exist to clearly define employment discrimination and harassment, 
zero tolerance for retaliatory behavior and other forms of code of conduct violations.  
There are at least eight independent internal investigative or personnel guidance 
resources at the disposal of department personnel for the reporting of misconduct or other 
types of organizational wrongdoing.  Yet, lawsuits filed by a number of Los Angeles 
Police Officers tell the real truth of the matter.  There is a flaw in the management of 
employee misconduct and possibly a need for a cultural overhaul.  
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This study intended to identify whether the whistle-blowing process is negatively 
impacted by current internal reporting avenues, and whether the current internal reporting 
structures in place influence the whistle-blower to report or not report organizational 
wrong-doing internally.  It is hoped that the results of this research would assist in the 
design or maintenance of effective management control systems for improving the 
organization while protecting and when appropriate rewarding the whistle-blower as a 
change agent rather than a disloyal dissenter. 
 By understanding how organizational factors may influence employees to report 
or prevent others from reporting wrongdoing, management may be able to examine and 
possibly modify existing practices to address obstacles and more effectively manage and 
encourage internal whistle-blowing.  
56 
 
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHOD 
 This study explored the act and impact of whistle-blowing from the perspective of 
sworn police officers who are employed by the LAPD.  The study specifically examined 
the decision-making process used by police officers for determining the likelihood of 
utilizing existing LAPD internal resources to report specific acts of employee 
misconduct, and the real or perceived consequences of whistle-blowing as imagined or 
experienced by employees.  To guide this study, the following research questions were 
developed. 
1. What is the reported likelihood of using each of the established internal 
misconduct reporting resources based on specific misconduct allegations? 
2. Are there differences in the reported likelihood of using internal misconduct 
reporting resources based on any specific acts of employee misconduct? 
3. What are the expressed reasons given for any misconduct reporting resources that 
are “Not Likely” to be used for reporting specific acts of employee misconduct? 
4. What are the perceived consequences of participating in the whistle-blowing 
process? 
Research Design 
The research was guided by an exploratory descriptive design using a self-
administered survey instrument. Quantitative data was collected via the survey 
instrument with a small amount of additional qualitative data.  Subjects were asked to 
report the likelihood (Highly Likely”, “Likely”, or “Not Likely”) of using internal 
avenues available to police officers for reporting specific types of misconduct, and 
whether or not influential factors in terms of specific experiences with a given resource or 
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perceived impact of reporting might influence their decision to report or not report 
specific allegations of misconduct.  
Advantages of Self-Administered Surveys 
 Self-administered surveys are said to be a preferred method of choice when 
managing sensitive information within specialized or professional groups (Edwards, 
1997).  The advantage of using the self-administered survey for this research was the 
ability of providing survey participants with a higher level confidentiality for the 
information they would provide because it was not necessary for them to disclose their 
personal identity.  These types of surveys also allow the participants the flexibility of 
completing them when and where it is most convenient.   
Disadvantage of Self-Administered Surveys 
 One disadvantage of a self-administered survey is that it is a labor intensive 
process to manage and control.  This disadvantage proved true for this study.  The LAPD 
mailroom was unprepared to handle the large volume (N = 740) of survey envelopes 
which lent itself to an unplanned and unexpected delay of surveys being sent to 
recipients.  Additionally, because the survey instrument did not ask the respondent to 
include his or her name on the document, it was not possible for the researcher to collect 
identity information for sending another survey, or to record the name or rank of who did 
not return surveys for possible follow-up procedures.   
Sources of Data 
Target Group 
 The sources of data for this study are actively employed sworn police officers 
who are members of the LAPD holding the rank or civil service classification of Police 
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Officers II and III, Sergeants I and II, Detectives I, II and III, Lieutenants I and II, 
Captains I, II, and III, and Commander.  Table 1 describes the population by rank and 
gender. 
Table 1  
Los Angeles Police Department Personnel Totals by Rank and Gender 
      Rank # Males # Females       Total 
      Commander               15              2                  17 
      Captain               64                       16                  80 
      Lieutenant              226              53                 279 
      Detective             1289             488                1777 
      Sergeant             1087             196                1283 
      Police officers             3992             958                4950 
      Totals              6673            1713               8386 
 
 
Human Participants Consideration 
This study sought to specifically examine, evaluate, and possibly modify specific 
department services provided to all LAPD employees by having survey participants 
anonymously identify their willingness to use organizational reporting avenues without 
having to disclose any information related to their specific identity, gender, ethnicity, 
rank, or job assignment.   
This study deals with the employee disclosure of very sensitive information that 
pertains to employee misconduct on the LAPD. Confidentiality and anonymity is of 
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utmost concern when protecting human subjects and it was the intent of this researcher to 
take very specific precautions to ensure that all participants remain protected from 
identity disclosure.  All participants were assured by the researcher in writing of the non-
coercive nature of the study and that all responses would remain confidential, derived 
anonymously, and maintained and reviewed only by this researcher.  
Pepperdine University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that the 
study met the exemption requirements under the federal regulations Category (2) of 45 
CFR 46.101 and agreed to waive the requirement of a signed consent form since the 
study involved survey procedures that do not identify any of the human subjects involved 
in the study (see Appendix A).   
It is typical for researchers to obtain organizational approval to conduct surveys, 
regardless of whether the researchers are members of the organization being surveyed.  
Organizational approval gatekeepers are typically from top management, unions and 
institutional review boards (Edwards, Thomas, Rosenfeld, & Booth-Kewley, 1997).  This 
researcher is a tenured sworn detective employed by the LAPD.  It is the expressed 
written policy of the LAPD that any internal survey being considered for employee 
participation must go through a strict organizational review process that begins with the 
researcher’s chain of command.  
The LAPD procedural manual (2009) states, in part: 
The Employee Relations Administrator shall review and evaluate any request 
for approval to use an employee survey.  The Employee Relations 
Administrator shall approve or disapprove the request and shall ensure that the 
following criteria are met: 
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1. The employee survey is not in conflict with the right of employee 
organizations to represent the interests of their members. 
2. The employee survey is appropriate in content and methodology. 
3. The employee survey would benefit the Department and/or law 
enforcement.  
(Section 3/220.55) 
Formal approval was provided through the researcher’s immediate supervisor, 
Bureau Commanding Officer, and the Department’s Employee Relations Administrator.  
The Employee Relations Administrator issued the researcher a signed LAPD 
Intradepartmental Correspondence (LAPD, Form 15.2) indicating that formal approval 
was granted (Appendix B).  After receiving appropriate departmental approvals, the 
researcher met with the union representing the police officers of the LAPD, the Los 
Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL) to assure them that the rights, anonymity, and 
confidentiality of the participants and any information being provided was not in 
violation with any established Memorandum of Understanding between the rank and file 
and department.  The researcher met with a representative of the LAPPL, Legal Counsel 
who reviewed the survey instrument and determined that the scope and purpose of this 
study fell within legal guidelines.  Formal approval was provided to the researcher in 
writing by the LAPPL Legal Counsel (Appendix C). 
Data Collection Strategy and Procedures 
The Survey Instrument 
 Self-administered survey instruments have a high degree of anonymity and 
confidentiality for surveys containing sensitive items (Edwards et al., 1997).  The survey 
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instrument for this study was designed in two parts.  Part one of the survey included a 
listing of the eight most common forms of employee misconduct allegations reported by 
LAPD employees between the years 2005 and 2009.  The first portion of the survey was 
designed to determine the employee’s likelihood of reporting or not reporting specific 
misconduct allegations through the use of eight established LAPD organizational 
reporting avenues.  
 The eight specific misconduct allegations reported by police officers and were 
extracted by the researcher from civil litigation Causes of Action filed in civil court by 
LAPD employee plaintiffs between January 2005 and June 2009. Table 2 illustrates the 
type of misconduct violations and the resource options provided to LAPD employees for 
the reporting of employee misconduct. 
Table 2   
Specific Misconduct Types and LAPD Reporting Avenues 
Specific Misconduct Type Departmental Reporting Avenues 
Sexual harassment in the workplace Any Department Supervisor (below the 
rank of Captain) 
Hostile, offensive, or intimidating work 
environment because of race or gender 
Any Command or Staff Officer (Captain 
or above) 
Disparate treatment following a work-related 
disability 
Internal Affairs Group 
Non-selection for promotion or pay-grade 
advancement because of race or gender 
Employee Relations Section 
Being subjected to gender or racially biased 
comments at work 
Work Environment Liaison Division 
A personality conflict with a supervisor that was 
negatively impacting him/her 
Office of the Inspector General 
Being denied a hardship change of watch or 
assignment because of race or gender 
Retaliation Prevention Unit 
Being denied a specialized training opportunity 
or assignment because of race or gender 




In Part One, respondents were asked to refer to each of the eight misconduct 
allegations and to check whether they would: Highly Likely, Likely, or Not Likely use 
when contemplating the use of each internal LAPD reporting resource listed should that 
listed type of behavior be personally experienced by him or her in the workplace.  A 
comment section followed each section of the listed allegations.  Respondents were asked 
to comment as to why any particular resource would “Not Likely” to be used by the 
respondent to report employee misconduct.    
Part Two of the survey contained a series of questions designed to measure the 
actual and/or perceived impact or consequences of whistle-blowing whether they have 
participated in the act of whistle-blowing or not.  Using the eight most common forms of 
employee misconduct, respondents were asked to refer to each allegation and then 
indicate the type of impact they would perceive receiving should they report any of the 
listed allegations through established LAPD reporting avenues.  Table 3 illustrates the 
most commonly reported types of impact listed by employee plaintiffs of civil lawsuits.  
Respondents were also provided with a choice of “satisfactory resolution” should they 
not perceive any negative consequences for reporting misconduct.  As in Part One, each 
question was followed by a comment section so that respondents were able to indicate 
another type of real or perceived impact not listed within the group of choices provided. 
The last item of the survey allowed respondents to provide suggestions or 
recommendations for improving existing internal reporting avenues for employees. 
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Table 3  
Reported Types of Impact for Reporting Specific Types of Misconduct 
Impact of reporting misconduct 
Alienation or silent treatment from co-workers 
Harsh treatment by co-workers 
Involuntary transfer of assignment 
Demotion or downgrade in rank 
Lowered performance evaluation 
Assigned to a job location far from home (freeway therapy) 




Survey Validity and Reliability 
Content Validity 
To determine the content validity of the survey instrument, the researcher 
assembled an expert panel of three certified LAPD Police Performance Auditors who are 
assigned to the LAPD’s Audit Division.  Audit Division personnel are responsible for 
conducting internal audits of various types of police performance actions for management 
review.  Panel members were asked to evaluate the survey instrument and determine the 
need for modifications to the surveys verbiage, question clarity, length, overall lay-out 
and, if deemed necessary, provide additional suggestions for meeting the objectives of 
this study.  The auditors each agreed that the contents of the survey appeared to meet the 
objectives of the research questions posed in clarity, length and overall lay-out.  The next 




A pilot testing of the survey instrument was conducted to determine whether any 
additional modifications to the survey were needed.  Five sworn members of the LAPD 
representative ranks to be surveyed were asked to participate in the testing of the survey 
instrument in order to assess whether the information being asked was relevant, clearly 
stated and to provide estimates of completion time for the survey instrument itself.  At the 
end of this process, the researcher was able to effectively evaluate the suggestions and 
content provided by the pilot group and make appropriate adjustments as needed. Only 
minor adjustments were made to the selection of wording for one or more questions. Pilot 
participants each indicated that the survey instrument took approximately 15-20 minutes 
to complete.  Members of the pilot group were excluded from the random selection 
process for survey participants. 
Sample Size 
Due to the sensitive nature of this study and the number of employee related 
lawsuits currently pending for issues related to whistle-blowing and allegations of 
organizational retaliation, a low response was anticipated. Table 4 lists the rank and 
gender distribution of participants who were sent surveys after obtaining the required 
approvals. 
Rea and Parker (1992) provide a formula for calculating minimal sample sizes for 
large populations and with interval-level data.  Using their tested formula, n = 370 was 





Table 4   
Sample Population by Rank and Gender   
Ranks Males Females Totals 
Commander         1 (1%)         1   (1%)           2   (2%) 
Captain         6 (8%)         1   (1%)           7   (9%) 
Lieutenant        20 (2%)         5   (6%)          25 (8%) 
Detective       114 (15%)        43 (6%)        157 (21%) 
Sergeant         96 (13%)        17 (2%)        113 (15%) 
Police Officer       352 (48%)        84 (11%)        436 (59%) 
Totals       589 (80%)      151 (20%)        740 (100%) 
 
  
 The LAPD-Deployment Roster Report (DRR) contains a current listing of 
employees by name, rank, ethnicity, hire date, serial number, and current work 
assignments.  In order to guarantee that an equal representation existed among gender and 
rank subgroups, each rank or civil service classification was first stratified by gender then 
systematically numbered.  Research Randomizer, an online software program for 
randomizing numbers, was used for randomizing each rank and gender grouping (see 
Urbaniak, 1997).  The following groups of personnel were excluded from the target 
population prior to the random selection process: 
1. Employees who were listed as being on long-term leave from the department 
2. Civilian or non-sworn employees and sworn members of certain rank or civil 
service classifications 
3. The ranks of Police Officer I, Deputy Chief and Chief of Police. 
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  A total of 740 sworn personnel were selected to participate in the study.   This 
number was determined to assist in increasing the rate of response while ensuring a 
margin of correction for those members of the population who may not be able to 
complete the survey (ineligibles) due to pre-scheduled vacations, military leave or on any 
other long or short term leave options.  Others may also be “non-responsive” or may opt 
to not participate in the study at all (Henry, 1990). 
Data Collection Procedures 
Potential participants each received an addressed survey packet discreetly 
packaged in a LAPD Inter-office Envelope stamped as “confidential” at their respective 
worksite. Inter-office envelopes are used by department personnel for managing 
interdepartmental business mail.  Pre-stamped return envelopes contained the name of the 
researcher and a designated U.S Post Office box address for respondents to use when 
returning the completed surveys.   
In order to maintain strict anonymity and confidentiality of survey participants, no 
demographic or other identifying information was asked of any participants.  A four to 
six week time frame was used for survey return and data collection. 
Data Collection Strategy 
Study participants were each sent a survey packet with a cover-letter from the 
researcher advising them of the purpose, intent and significance of this study and that 
they had been randomly selected as a possible participant.  Each survey packet contained 
the cover-letter from the researcher, survey instrument and return envelope with postage 
affixed.  Packets were sent via intradepartmental LAPD mail service to each selected 
participant’s worksite in a concealed LAPD envelope marked “confidential”.  In order to 
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ensure the confidentiality of their participation, survey participants were asked for their 
voluntary compliance in completing the survey instrument outside of their regularly 
scheduled work breaks, and preferably away from their work environment.   
Participants were also asked to send the completed survey affixed with postage 
and return address by mail to the specified post office address provided by researcher.  
The cover-letter also indicated that those who chose to receive personal feedback at the 
conclusion of the research project may contact the researcher independently to receive a 
summary of the results of the study without identifying individual survey responses.   
Analysis 
 Prior to analysis, the data file was cleaned for errors using SPSS software 
analysis.  Descriptive statistics was used to analyze the quantitative data.  All returned 
survey data was organized, recorded and then entered into a SPSS-15 data analysis 
software program for appropriate identification of frequency distributions.  Frequency 
distributions determined the percentage of officers who would utilize a particular 
resource and which real or perceived consequences corresponded to any of the eight 
specific allegations of misconduct listed.   
Content Analysis  
Content analysis was used by this researcher to identify topics and themes in the 
expressed comments provided by respondents in order to gain a richer understanding of 
findings when considered along with the quantitative data.  Microsoft-Excel provided the 
means for segmenting the comments into descriptive themes or types.  The process used 
followed the recommendations of Creswell (2003): 
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1. All qualitative data (expressed comments) were organized on to electronic 
spreadsheets to enable the coding of topics and themes.  
2. The data was reviewed several times to get a general sense of the overall meaning 
and tone   
3. A coding process was used to organize the data into “chunks” by segmenting 
descriptive sentences or paragraphs into topics with terms based on the language 
used by the survey respondents. 
4. Coded topics were then considered for evidence of any recurring themes. 
5. Topics and themes were considered alongside the quantitative data findings.  
6. The findings were conveyed using both narrative and graphic means to describe 
the emerging themes and/or multiple perspectives expressed. 
Written responses to survey questions 1-8 relating to the “Not Likely” use of 
department internal resource options were divided into three main categories: Individual 
preference, organizational specific and general commentary.  Individual preferences 
include a respondent’s reason for not utilizing an identified resource.  Organizational 
specific included a respondent’s description of a specific aspect of the organization’s 
structure or culture that may have influence on the respondent’s decision to not utilize a 
given resource option.  General commentary refers to any miscellaneous statements 
personal opinions provided by the respondent.  Written comments for questions 9-16 
were divided into Organizational specific and General commentary.  These comment 
boxes were designed to obtain additional descriptions of consequences not listed in the 
survey question.  Comments that described additional consequences were coded as being 
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organizational specific.  Comments that did not meet these criteria were coded as being 
general commentary.   
External Validity 
The strategy used to ensure external validity of the qualitative data was the 
inclusion of a detailed description of findings as “shared experiences” so as to present a 
solid framework for the study (Creswell, 2003).  Several techniques of reliability were 
used for the testing of external validity.  First, a triangulation of data collection and 
analysis was used to strengthen reliability and internal validity.  Second, data collection 
and analysis was then reported in a clear, detailed manner to provide the reader with a 
good understanding of the analytical methods used to capture emergent themes from the 
expressed comments.  Lastly, a second researcher assisted in theme development. 
Coder Reliability 
  To determine coder reliability, a doctoral graduate from Pepperdine University 
served as a peer examiner of the qualitative findings.  Second, the careful and deliberate 
multiple reviews of the qualitative data following Creswell’s (2003) strategies support 
intra-rater reliability. This process occurred prior to the third strategy that involved a 
second researcher. In order to ensure reliable interpretation of qualitative data, the coded 
data was reviewed in depth by the peer examiner who is experienced in textual analysis. 
Coding results were discussed and extensive discussions regarding any identifiable 
conclusions.  The coding process continued until consensus was obtained. Several areas 
presented challenging considerations; these involved the areas of determining 
relationships among comments that did not comply with instructions given, and ensuring 
researcher objectivity.   
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As a law enforcement officer employed by the organization being surveyed it was 
critically important to be self-aware and to be able to acknowledge when personal 
assumptions or bias may possibly interfere with the coding or interpretation of comments.  
One way to deter this from occurring was to engage in frequent dialogue with the co-
reviewer about emerging patterns. Written comments indicating that a particular resource 
was an unacceptable option for any reason was coded as Other resource option preferred.  
Descriptions of behaviors that pertained to the fear of retaliation or retribution that may 
dissuade him/her from reporting to the described resource were coded as Fear of 
Retaliation.   
Any expressed statements pertaining to a real or perceived code of silence were 
coded as code of silence.  Expressed comments that alluded to an experienced or 
perceived negative successful outcome were coded as No successful outcome.  Comments 
that indicated that respondents preferred to manage the reported misconduct themselves 
without intervention or who preferred to not report the misconduct were coded as Self-
manage.  Comments that described additional consequences were coded as being 
organizational specific.  Comments that did not meet these criteria were coded as being 
general commentary.   
Assumptions and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
 There were several assumptions made during this research study: 
1. There would be significant impacts to employees who whistle-blow or report 
selected types of misconduct to internal reporting avenues.  
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2. The majority of whistle-blowing employees who report selected types of 
misconduct in the law enforcement profession are police officers above the 
rank of recruit and below the rank of deputy chief.  
3. Respondents will be candid in their responses.  
4. Respondents will only submit one survey per participant.   
5. The survey response rate would be over 20 percent due to the current trend of 
employee related civil lawsuits and the researcher being an employee within 
the organization. 
Delimitations 
 One delimitation of the study was the requirement that all survey participants be 
sworn members of the Los Angeles Police Department between the ranks of Police 
Officer II through Commander.  This requirement was based on a review of 53 civil 
lawsuits filed by Los Angeles Police Officers between the years 2004 and 2008 which 
indicated that very few of these lawsuits were filed by civilian or non-sworn employees, 
and the assumption that more sworn police officers would use the internal reporting 
systems in place for whistle-blowing.  The population was reduced by the elimination of 
the Police Officer 1 and Deputy Chief ranks, due to the assumption that probationary 
officers (Police Officer1) and rank of Deputy Chief rarely utilize the internal misconduct 
reporting systems in place for employees.  As a result of these assumptions and 
requirements, the population sampling and subsequent findings are limited in scope. 
Summary 
 A self-administered survey instrument was distributed to 740 sworn police 
officers employed by the Los Angeles Police Department using a proportionate random 
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sampling method stratified by gender within each rank.  The instrument included a list of 
eight (8) of the most common employee misconduct violations reported by LAPD police 
officers to external reporting sources.  Survey participants were asked to determine the 
likelihood of reporting each of the given misconduct allegations through each of the eight 
(8) internal resources listed, indicate why they would “Not Likely” use a particular 
resource and lastly, identify any actual or perceived consequences or impacts caused by 
reporting these allegations through internal reporting avenues.  
Quantitative Research data was obtained, recorded and imported into SPSS-15 
statistical analysis software.  Expressed comments were analyzed and coded for themes 
and patterns using Microsoft-Excel software.  Many of the survey respondents did not 
provide in-depth responses as to why particular resources were not chosen as a likely 
resource option for reporting misconduct.  A total of 80 responses were analyzed.  The 
qualitative data was reviewed by a peer reviewer to determine coder reliability.  To 
ensure intra-rater reliability, the peer reviewer and researcher had an independent review 
of the data followed by frequent dialogues about the data findings in order to remove the 
possibility of researcher bias. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
 The purpose of this chapter is to present the analyses and findings of the study. 
Descriptive analyses were performed in order to answer the four research questions. The 
presentation of findings will match the structure of the survey instrument.  Part one of the 
instrument was designed to determine the respondent’s likelihood of reporting or not 
reporting specific misconduct allegations through the use of eight established LAPD 
organizational reporting avenues. Part two of the instrument was designed to measure the 
actual and/or perceived impact or consequences of whistle-blowing. The quantitative 
survey responses will be integrated with the analyzed qualitative data of respondents’ 
comments.  Each type of misconduct will be addressed separately.   
Final Sample for Analysis 
The targeted population (N = 740) consisted of a random sampling of the civil 
service classifications of Police Officer (59%, n = 436), Sergeant (15%, n = 113), 
Detective (21%, n = 157), Lieutenants (8%, n = 25), Captains (9%, n = 7), and 
Commander (2%, n = 2), stratified by gender (males = 80%, n = 589, females = 20%,  
n = 151) within each rank.  Of the 740 surveys distributed, a total of 131 useable surveys 
were returned for a response rate of 18%. The returned surveys contained a number of 
missing or non-responses to one or more of the survey questions.  The presentation of 
results will include the total number of responses received for each survey question. 
Survey Responses: Part One 
 The eight types of misconduct were analyzed as described in Chapter III.  Table 
D2 (Appendix D) illustrates the likelihood of reporting each of the specific acts of 
misconduct to each of the internal reporting resources.  To aid in the explanation of the 
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results, the presentation of findings will include (a) each internal resource receiving the 
highest percentage of respondents indicating a likeliness of use for reporting the listed 
type of misconduct and (b) the internal resource rated as being the least likely to be 
utilized. 
 Respondents were also requested to add comments for any reporting option in 
which they were unlikely to utilize to report each of the specific allegations of 
misconduct.  Each resource with an “Unlikely” response rate of 40% or more is 
presented.   
Misconduct Type: Sexual Harassment 
For the reporting of sexual harassment, Supervisor, below the rank of Captain, as 
a reporting resource, was selected by the highest number of respondents (79.1%, n = 
102).  Of these, 50.4% (n = 65) indicated that they would be “Highly Likely” or “Likely” 
(28.7%, n = 37) to contact a supervisor to report allegations of sexual harassment.  Two 
additional resources were also selected by a large percentage of respondents, Command 
or Staff Officer, 72.3% (n = 94), and Internal Affairs Group, 68.4% (n = 89).   
The resource selected as the “least likely” to be utilized was Behavioral Science 
Services (BSS), 76.7% (n = 99).  Over 55% of the respondents (55.4%, n = 71) also 
indicated their unwillingness to utilize the Work Environment Liaison Division for the 
reporting of sexual harassment.  The reported likelihood of utilizing each of the eight 
internal resource options to report sexual harassment is illustrated below (Table 5). 
Supervisor, below the rank of Captain and Command or Staff Officer each had a mode 
value of 3 or “Highly Likely”.  The Internal Affairs Group had a mode value of 2 or 
“Likely”.  The resource entities of Employee Relations Section,  Work Environment 
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Liaison Division, Office of the Inspector General, Retaliation Prevention Unit, and 
Behavioral Science Services each had a mode value of 1 or “Unlikely”. 
Table 5   
Respondents Reporting Sexual Harassment Through Internal Resource Options 
Misconduct:  













































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings. 
 
 
Resource: Behavioral Science Services 
The largest number of respondents (79%, n = 99) indicated that BSS was not a 
likely reporting resource.  There were 29 written comments provided as to why BSS 
would not be a resource option.  Respondents indicated that BSS does not formally 
investigate misconduct and as such would not utilize this resource.  Others indicated that 
they had no confidence in receiving a satisfactory resolution for the reporting of this issue 
or expressed negative opinions of BSS.  Several respondents indicated that they either did 
not trust BSS or would rather self manage their personal issues without receiving 
psychological assistance from the department. 
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Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division   
Just over 55% of the respondents (55.4%, n = 72) indicated that the WELD was 
not a likely reporting resource. There were five written comments provided as to why 
WELD would not be a resource option.  The respondents indicated (a) the resource could 
not help with resolving these types of issues or (b) they were unaware of the unit’s 
responsibilities. 
Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit 
Over 47% of the respondents (47.3%, n = 61) indicated that the RPU was not a 
likely reporting resource.  There were 12 written comments provided as to why the RPU 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons cited include the preference of 
utilizing other internal resource options, a lack of confidence in any successful outcome 
to the issue, and an overall unfamiliarity of the unit’s existence or job responsibilities.  
Specific organizational reasons include the perception that the unit does not manage or 
investigate misconduct complaints and several others commented that they believed their 
chain of command would initiate this notification, if they found it necessary to do so. 
Resource: Office of the Inspector General  
Over 46% of the respondents (46.9%, n = 61) indicated that the OIG was not a 
likely reporting resource.  There were six written comments provided as to why RPU 
would not be a resource option.  Comments include an overall lack of confidence and/or 
trust in their investigative ability or preference to utilize another internal resource entity.  
Specific organizational reasons included the preferred use of the department’s established 
chain of command or the perception that the unit is an “outside entity.” 
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Misconduct Type: Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating Work Environment 
For the reporting of a hostile or offensive work environment, the Supervisor, 
below the rank of Captain, was selected by the highest number of respondents  
(78.5%, n = 102).  Of these, 45.4% (n = 59) indicated that they would be “Highly 
Likely” or “Likely” (33.1%, n = 43) to contact a supervisor to report a hostile work 
harassment.  Over 70% of the respondents (74.8%, n = 98) indicated they would contact 
a Command or Staff Officer and the Internal Affairs Group, 71.8%, (n = 94).  The 
resource selected as the “least likely”  (73.1%, n = 99) to be utilized was Behavioral 
Science Services, (BSS).  The reporting resources of Supervisor, below rank of Captain; 
Command/Staff Officer; and Internal Affairs Group each had a mode value of 3 or 
“Highly Likely”.  The Retaliation Prevention Unit had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”.  
The reporting resources of Employee Relations Section, Work Environment Liaison 
Division, Office of the Inspector General, and Behavioral Science Services, all had a 
mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”.  
The reported likelihood of utilizing each of the eight internal resource options to 
report a hostile, offensive or intimidating work environment is illustrated in Table 6. 
Resource: Employee Relations Section 
Over 45% of the respondents (45.4%, n = 59) indicated that the Employee 
Relations Section (ERS) was not a likely resource.  There were four comments provided 
as to why ERS would not be a resource option.  Respondents indicated that they either (a) 
did not trust that a satisfactory resolution to the reported issue would occur or (b) that the 
non-investigative function of the entity or the entity’s complaint referral policy was an 
issue.   
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Table 6  
 
Respondents Reporting a Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating Work Environment through 
Internal Resource Options 
Misconduct: 
 















































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings. 
 
Resource:  Work Environment Liaison Division 
Fewer than 50% of the respondents (49.2%, n = 64) indicated that the WELD was 
not a likely resource.  There were three comments provided by respondents as to why 
WELD would not be a resource option. Respondents indicated that they were unfamiliar 
with the duties and responsibilities of WELD, or did not believe that the unit was a viable 
resource for the reporting of misconduct without, specific examples as to why. 
Resource:  Office of the Inspector General   
Over 40% (40.8%, n = 53) indicated that the OIG was not a likely resource. There 
were four comments provided by respondents by as to why the OIG would not be a 
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resource option.  Respondents indicated that they had never heard of the OIG, did not 
trust this resource as a viable entity, or did not believe that it was a requirement to contact 
the OIG for these types of complaints. 
Resource:  Behavioral Science Services   
A large number of respondents (73.1%, n = 95) indicated that BSS, was not a 
likely reporting resource.  There were three written comments provided as to why BSS 
would not be a resource option.  Respondents indicated that they (a) did not trust BSS or 
the services they provide and (b) that they would rather seek psychological assistance 
outside of the LAPD. 
Misconduct Type: Disparate Treatment (Disability) 
For the reporting of disparate treatment due to a work-related disability, the 
Supervisor, below the rank of Captain, was selected by a large number of respondents 
(83.9%, n = 109).  Of these, 43.1% (n = 56) indicated that they would be “Highly 
Likely” or “Likely” (40.8%, n = 53) to contact a supervisor to report allegations of 
disparate treatment.  One additional resource, Command or Staff Officer (68.3%, n = 82), 
was also selected by a large number of respondents for the likelihood of reporting 
disparate treatment.  
The resource selected as the “least likely” to be utilized was Behavioral Science 
Services (64.3%, n = 83).  The Internal Affairs Group, Employee Relations Section, 
Work Environment Liaison Section, Office of the Inspector General, the Retaliation 
Prevention Unit, and Behavioral Science Services each had a mode value of 1 or “Not 
Likely”. The internal resources of Supervisor  had a mode value of 3 or “Highly Likely”.  
Command or Staff Officer had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”.  The reported likelihood of 
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utilizing each of the eight internal resource options to report disparate treatment is 
indicated in Table 7. 
Table 7  
Respondents Reporting Disparate Treatment Through Internal Resource Options 
Misconduct:  













































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings 
 
 
Resource: Internal Affairs Group  
Over 50% (51.2%, n = 66) indicated that the IAG, was not a likely resource. 
There were four comments provided by respondents by as to why the IAG would not be a 
resource option.  Responses provided by respondents for not utilizing this resource 
include (a) their preference of self-managing the issue without intervention or (b) the lack 
of confidence that a disability issue would be properly addressed by this entity.   
Resource: Employee Resource Section  
Over 40% (42.2%, n = 54) indicated that the ERS, was not a likely resource.  
There were five comments provided by respondents as to why the ERS would not be a 
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resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents not utilizing this resource 
include a lack of trust in all department Captains, the preference of utilizing an alternate 
internal resource or of self-managing the issue without intervention. Organizational 
reasons include a preference to utilize the lowest chain of command (Supervisor, below 
rank of captain). 
Resource:  Work Environment Liaison Division   
Over 50% (53.5%, n = 69) indicated that WELD, was not a likely resource.  
There were six comments provided by respondents as to why WELD would not be a 
resource option. Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include a preference for 
other internal resource options, lack of confidence that a satisfactory outcome will be 
achieved, unfamiliarity with the entity's responsibilities, and the preference of self-
managing the issue. Organizational reasons include the non-investigative function of the 
unit for the resolution of misconduct complaints. 
Resource:  Office of the Inspector General  
Over 60% of the respondents (60.4%, n = 78), indicated that the OIG, was not a 
likely resource.  There were five comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons include the preference of self-
managing the issue without intervention, and a preference for utilizing other specialized 
resource options.  Organizational reasons include the preference of remaining within the 
established chain of command for reporting this type of misconduct. 
Resource:  Retaliation Prevention Unit 
Over 50% of the respondents (51.9%, n = 67) indicated that the RPU was not a 
likely resource.  There were five comments provided by respondents as the why the RPU 
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would not be a resource option.  Individual responses provided by respondents include a 
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention. Organizational reasons for 
not utilizing this resource include the perception that this resource would not formally 
investigate this type of issue. 
Resource:  Behavioral Science Services  
Over 60% of the respondents (64.3%, n = 83) indicated that BSS was not a likely 
resource.  There were six comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would not 
be a resource option.  Individual reasons include a preference for an alternative internal 
resource option, preference to self-manage the issue without intervention or lack of 
confidence in a satisfactory outcome.  Organizational reasons include the non-
investigative function of the entity. 
Misconduct Type: Non-Selection for Promotion – Race or Gender 
For the reporting of a non-selection for promotion or pay-grade assignment due to 
race or gender, the internal resource option of Command or Staff Officer was selected by 
the highest number of respondents (65.5%, n = 76).  Of these, 29.2% (n = 38) indicated 
that they would be “Highly Likely” or “Likely” (29.2%, n = 38) to contact a Command 
or Staff Officer to report non-selection for promotion due to race or gender.  The next 
highest number of respondents indicated that they would also contact Employee 
Relations Section 57.8% (n = 74).  The resource selected as the “least likely” to be 
utilized was Behavioral Science Services (82.2%, n = 106).  All eight resource options 
had a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”. The reported likelihood of utilizing each of the 
eight internal resource options to report non-selection for promotion or pay-grade 
advancement due to race or gender is shown below (Table 8).   
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Table 8  
 
Respondents Reporting a Non-selection for Promotion (Race or Gender) Through 
Internal Resource Options 
Misconduct:  













































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings 
 
 
Resource:  Internal Affairs Group  
Over 40% of the respondents (43.8%, n = 72) indicated that IAG), was not a 
likely resource.  There were 14 comments provided by respondents as the why the RPU 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include 
a preference of other internal resource options, lack of confidence in receiving a 
satisfactory resolution to the issue, and fear of retribution.  Organizational reasons 
included several general comments relating to the perceived strong element of proof 
needed to report this type of misconduct and the belief that this type of misconduct would 
not be investigated by IAG.  One respondent wrote, "I am not part of a protected class so 
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reporting this behavior would probably be detrimental to my career/professional life" 
(R107). 
Resource:  Office of the Inspector General    
Over 55% of the respondents (55.9%, n = 74) indicated that the OIG, was not a 
likely resource.  There were 19 comments provided by respondents as the why the OIG 
would not be a resource option. Individual responses include other internal resource 
option preferred, unfamiliarity with the resource's investigative functions, lack of trust in 
the entity or satisfactory outcome of the issue being reported, and the fear of retaliation.  
Organizational reasons for not utilizing this resource include a preference for established 
chain of command and several general commentaries referring to the perceived 
preferential treatment given to lawfully protected classes for promotions.   
Resource:  Retaliation Prevention Unit  
Over 58% of the respondents (58.5%, n = 76) indicated that the RPU, was not a 
likely resource.  There were 17 comments provided by respondents as the why the RPU 
would not be a likely resource option. Individual responses include a lack of confidence 
in a satisfactory resolution to the issue, other resource option preferences, fear of 
retaliation, or unfamiliarity with the resource's investigative responsibilities.  
Organizational reasons include the non-investigative function of the unit and general 
commentary regarding preferential selection of members of protected classes. 
Resource:  Behavioral Science Services  
Over 82% of the respondents (82.2%, n = 106) indicated that BSS, would not be a 
likely resource option.  There were 24 comments provided by respondents as to why the 
BSS was not a resource option.  Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include 
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the choice of other preferred internal options, lack of confidence in a satisfactory 
resolution, mistrust of the entity, and fear of retribution.  Organizational reasons include 
the non-investigative function of this entity and general commentary regarding the 
perception that this entity would not have the ability to resolve the reported issue.  
Misconduct Type: Gender or Racial Comments at Work 
For the reporting of gender or racial comments at work, the internal resource 
option of Supervisor, below the rank of Captain was selected by the highest  
number of respondents (75.4%, n = 98).  Of these, 43.8% (n = 57) indicated that they 
would be “Highly Likely” or “Likely” (31.5%, n = 41) to contact a supervisor to report 
being subjected to gender or racial comments at work.  The next highest number of 
respondents (69%, n = 89) indicated that they would contact a Command or Staff Officer.  
The likelihood of reporting to a supervisor, Internal Affairs Group, and Command or 
Staff Officer, received a mode value of 3 or “Highly Likely”.  The remaining resource 
options of Employee Relations Group, Work Environment Liaison Division, Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG), Retaliation Prevention Unit, and the Behavioral Science 
Services (BSS), each received a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”.  The percentage of 
respondents who would likely report gender and/or racial comments to a department 
resource are listed below (Table 9). 
Resource: Employee Relations Section  
Over 50% of the respondents (51.5%, n = 67) indicated that Employee Relations 
Section (ERS) was not a likely resource.  There were nine comments provided by 
respondents as to why the BSS would not be a resource option.  Individual responses 
include the preference of self-managing the issue without intervention, the perception that 
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this entity could not influence a change in behavior, the fear of retaliation, and lack of 
confidence in there being a successful outcome to the issue.   
Table 9  
 
Respondents Reporting Gender and/or Racial Comments at Work Through Department 
Options 
Misconduct:  













































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings 
 
 
Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division  
Over 60% of the respondents (60.8%, n = 79) indicated that WELD was not a 
likely resource.  There were 11 comments provided by respondents as to why WELD was 
not a resource option. Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include the 
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention, lack of confidence in the 




Resource:  Office of the Inspector General 
Fifty percent of the respondents (n = 64) indicated that the OIG, was not a likely 
resource.  There were 17 comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG would 
not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided include, an overall lack of 
confidence that the problem would be resolved, lack of trust in the entity's investigative 
ability, preference to self-manage the issue without intervention, and unfamiliarity with 
the resource's function.  Organizational reasons include the perceived non-investigative 
function of the entity.   
Resource:  Retaliation Prevention Unit  
Over 46% of the respondents (46.6%, n = 96) indicated that the RPU was not a 
likely resource.  There were 14 comments provided by respondents as to why the RPU 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include 
a general distrust in the entity's investigative ability to resolve misconduct issues, 
unfamiliarity with the entity's responsibilities, the preference for self-managing the issue 
without intervention, and the lack of confidence in a satisfactory outcome.  Several 
commented that this type of misconduct would not be resolved by this entity because it is 
not considered to be retaliatory conduct.  Organizational reasons include the perception 
of non-investigative function associated with the entity, and a general opinion about the 
entire department being less than professional with respect to managing internal 
employee complaints. 
Resource:  Behavioral Science Services   
Over 75% of the respondents (75.6%, n = 61) indicated that BSS was not a likely 
resource.  There were 21 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS was not a 
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resource option.  Individual reasons include a lack of confidence in a successful outcome, 
lack of trust in their ability to assist, and the preference of self-managing their issue 
without psychological intervention.  Several respondents indicated that they would only 
contact this entity if the misconduct was affecting their ability to work.  Organizational 
reasons include the non-investigative function of this entity. 
Misconduct Type: Personality Conflict With a Supervisor  
For the reporting of a personality conflict with a supervisor with negative 
impacts, Command or Staff Officer was selected by the highest number of respondents 
(73.8%, n = 96).  Of these, 44.6% (n = 58) indicated that they would “Highly Likely” or 
“Likely” (29.2%, n = 28) contact a Command or Staff Officer to report a conflict with a 
supervisor with negative impacts.  The next highest number of respondents (58.1%, n = 
75) indicated that they would contact a Supervisor, below the rank of Captain.  The 
reporting resource of Command or Staff Officer had a mode value of 3 or “Highly 
Likely”.  The other seven internal reporting resources of Supervisor, under the rank of 
Captain, Internal Affairs Group, Employee Relations Section, Work Environment Liaison 
Division, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Retaliation Prevention Unit, and 
Behavioral Science Services all had a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”.  The percentage 
of respondents who would report a personality conflict with a supervisor to a department 
resource is illustrated below (Table 10). 
Resource:  Internal Affairs Group  
Over 55% of the respondents (55.8%, n = 72) indicated that Internal Affairs 
Group (IAG) was not a likely resource. There were 28 comments provided by 
respondents as to why IAG would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided 
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by respondents include the preferred use of alternate internal resource options, the 
perception about this type of complaint not rising to the level of a formal misconduct 
investigation, or not being a viable resource for help. One respondent commented that he 
or she experienced retaliation for “reporting misconduct in the past from the accused and 
the investigating officer at Internal Affairs" (R121).  Organizational reasons include the 
preference of reporting through the established chain of command at the lowest 
supervisor level first, or reporting it only if action was not taken at the supervisor’s level.   
Several respondents had the perception that a complaint investigation would not 
be initiated and that personality conflicts of this type are too common on the department 
for supervisors to manage. 
Table 10  
Respondents Reporting a Conflict With Supervisor Through Internal Options 
Misconduct:  




















































































































Resource:  Employee Relations Section 
Over 55% of the respondents (58.6%, n = 75) indicated that ERS was not a likely 
resource.  There were 19 comments provided by respondents as to why ERS would not be 
a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include, (a) preferences 
for other internal resource options, and (b) the preference to transfer in fear of retribution.  
Organizational reasons include the preference of utilizing the organization's established 
chain of command and the perceived notion that this entity does not handle this type of 
misconduct. 
Resource:  Work Environment Liaison Division   
Over 60% of the respondents (61.5%, n = 80) indicated that WELD would not be 
a likely resource.  There were 19 comments provided by respondents as to why WELD 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include the 
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention, not having confidence in a 
successful outcome, preference for other specialized resource options, the fear of 
retribution, and general unfamiliarity with the resource function.  Organizational reasons 
include the non-investigative and referral policies of the entity and preference to utilize 
the organization's chain of command. 
Resource:  Office of the Inspector General 
 Over 65% of the respondents (65.6%, n = 84) indicated that the OIG would not 
be a likely resource.  There were 22 comments provided by respondents as to why the 
OIG would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include 
the fear of retribution.  One respondent wrote, "it is not encouraged to bad mouth 
supervisors, or anyone above.” (R27) Other reasons include the preference of self-
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managing the issue without intervention, the preference for early intervention by 
preventing a formal complaint, and other preferred internal resource options.  
Organizational reasons include the lack of trust in the entity's ability to conduct a 
thorough, unbiased and appropriate investigation, length of time to resolve the issue, and 
unfamiliarity with the investigative functions of the entity. 
Resource:  Retaliation Prevention Unit  
Over 55% of the respondents (55.5%, n = 71) indicated that the RPU would not 
be a likely resource.  There were 22 comments provided by respondents as to why the 
RPU would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents 
include, a lack of confidence for a successful outcome, preference to self-manage the 
issue without intervention, fear of retaliation or retribution, and preference for an 
alternate internal resource option.  Organizational reasons for not utilizing this resource 
include the preference of utilizing existing chain of command, the perceived non-
investigatory function of the entity, and the belief that this type of misconduct did not rise 
to the level of a retaliation allegation.   
Resource:  Behavioral Science Services   
Over 60% of the respondents (68.5%, n = 87) indicated that BSS would not be a 
likely resource.  There were 24 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would 
not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include having 
other preferred resource options, no confidence in achieving a satisfactory outcome, 
preference to self-manage without intervention, fear of retaliation.  The organizational 
reasons for not utilizing this resource include the preference of utilizing the established 
chain of command; 
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Misconduct Type: Denied Hardship - Watch or Assignment Change 
For the reporting of being denied a hardship change of watch or change of 
assignment because of race or gender, Command or Staff Officer was selected by the 
highest number of respondents (71.5%, n = 89). Of these, respondents indicated that they 
would be “Highly Likely” (42.2%, n = 54), or “Likely” (29.3%, n = 35) to report being 
denied a hardship change of watch or change of assignment because of race or gender to 
a Command or Staff Officer.  The next highest number of respondents (66.4%), n = 85) 
indicated that they would contact a Supervisor below the rank of Captain.  The least 
likely utilized resource was Behavioral Science Services, 74% (n = 95).  The reporting 
resource options of Supervisor and Command or Staff Officer had a mode value of  3 or 
“Highly Likely”.  
The remaining six resource options of Internal Affairs Group, Employee 
Relations Group, Work Environment Liaison Division, Office of the Inspector General, 
Retaliation Prevention Unit, and Behavioral Science Services had mode values of 1 or 
“Not Likely”.  The percentage of respondents who indicated they would likely utilize 
these resource options to report a denied hardship-watch or assignment change due to 
race and/or gender is illustrated below (Table 11). 
Resource:  Internal Affairs Group  
Over 50% of the respondents (52.0%, n = 65) indicated that IAG was not a likely 
resource. There were 30 comments provided by respondents as to why IAG was not a 
resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include the fear of 
retaliation, preference for another resource option, lack of confidence in a successful 
outcome, and the preference of self-managing the reported issue without intervention.  A 
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respondent wrote, "I wouldn't report this because the possibility for retaliation is too high 
and this is not a battle worth fighting" (R18).  An organizational reason provided by 
several respondents involved the preferred use of the established chain of command. 
Table 11  
 
Respondents Reporting a Denied Change of Watch or Assignment Hardship Through 
Internal Options 
Misconduct:  














































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings. 
 
 
Resource:  Employee Relations Section   
Over 45% of the respondents (49.2%, n = 63) indicated that ERS was not a likely 
resource.  There were 21 comments provided by respondents as to why ERS would not be 
a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents included the lack of 
confidence in obtaining a satisfactory resolution of the issue, other preferred internal 
resource option, fear of retaliation, unfamiliarity with the resource entity, and the 
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention. One respondent indicated that 
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the "System would support any decisions against you" (R60). Organizational reasons for 
not utilizing this resource include the preference of utilizing the organization's chain of 
command.   
Resource:  Work Environment Liaison Division  
Over 55% of the respondents (59.4%, n = 76) indicated that WELD  was not a 
likely resource. There were 27 comments provided by respondents as to why WELD 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include the 
preference of utilizing alternate internal resources, the belief that change would occur, 
and the fear of retaliation. Other reasons include the preference to self-manage the issue 
without intervention, and unfamiliarity with the entity's function.  Organizational reasons 
include the preference of utilizing the organization's chain of command and the 
preference of contacting resources with investigative functions. 
Resource:  Office of the Inspector General  
Over 60% of the respondents (62.2%, n = 79) indicated that OIG was not a likely 
resource.  There were 27 comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG would 
not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include the lack of 
confidence in a satisfactory resolution of the issue, the preference of utilizing an 
alternative resource option, the preference to self-manage the issue without intervention, 
and fear of retaliation.  Organizational reasons include the preference of utilizing the 
established chain of command and the preference of contacting a resource with 
investigative authority.  One respondent indicated, "The dept will slowly destroy you for 
"snitching" (R64).  
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Resource:  Retaliation Prevention Unit  
 Over 50% of the respondents (56.7%, n = 72) indicated that RPU was not a 
likely resource.  There were a total of 27 comments provided by respondents as to why 
the RPU would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents 
include the preference of utilizing an alternate internal resource option, lack of 
confidence in achieving a successful outcome to the issue, fear of retaliation for reporting 
the issue, perception that reporting would not affect needed change, or that the issue 
would be too difficult to prove.  Many of the respondents commented on the possibility 
of retribution for reporting misconduct to the organization.  Organizational reasons 
include the preference of utilizing the organization's established chain of command.   
Resource:  Behavioral Science Services  
Over 74% of the respondents (74.8%, n = 95) indicated that BSS was not a likely 
resource.  There were 34 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would not be 
a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include preferences for 
other internal resource options, lack of confidence in achieving a satisfactory outcome, 
lack of trust in their ability to assist, and preference to self-manage the issue without 
intervention.  Several respondents indicated that they would only contact this entity if the 
misconduct was affecting their ability to work.  Organizational reasons include the non-
investigative function of this entity. 
Misconduct Type: Denied Specialized Training or Assignment - Race or Gender 
 For the reporting of being denied specialized training or assignment because of 
race or gender, Command or Staff Officer was selected by the highest number of 
respondents (63.3%, n = 81).  Of these, respondents indicated that they would be “Highly 
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Likely” (24.8%, n = 32), or “Likely” (34.1%, n = 76) to report being denied a hardship 
change of watch or change of assignment because of race or gender to a Command or 
Staff Officer. The next highest number of respondents (58.9%, n = 76) indicated that they 
would contact a supervisor, below the rank of Captain.  The least likely resource to be 
utilized by respondents was Behavioral Science Services (77%, n = 97).  All eight of the 
reporting resource options had a mode value of 1 or “Unlikely”. The percentage of 
respondents who indicated they would likely utilize these resource options to report a 
denied training opportunity due to race or gender is illustrated below (Table 12). 
Table 12   
 
Respondents Reporting a Denied Specialized Training or Assignment (Race/Gender) 
Through Internal Resource Options 
Misconduct:  



















































































































Resource:  Internal Affairs Group  
Over 55% of the respondents (57.5%, n = 73) indicated that IAG was not a likely 
resource option.  There were 14 comments provided by respondents as to why IAG 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include a 
lack of confidence in a satisfactory outcome, preference for an alternate internal resource 
option, and fear of retaliation. Organizational reasons include (a) a preference to utilize 
the organization's established chain of command, and (b) past negative experiences with 
the entity.  On respondent commented, “A complaint wouldn’t be taken by IAG… if so it 
would go nowhere and it would be a death sentence for the officer reporting in LAPD!” 
(R14). 
Resource:  Employee Resource Section  
Over 50% of the respondents (54.7%, n = 70) indicated that ERS was not a 
resource option.  There were nine comments provided by respondents as to why ERS 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include a 
preference for utilizing another internal resource, lack of confidence in achieving a 
satisfactory outcome, and fear of retaliation.  Organizational reasons include the 
preference of utilizing the organization's chain of command, and the perception that this 
entity does not investigate this type of misconduct. 
Resource:  Work Environment Liaison Division  
Over 60% of the respondents (64.8%, n = 83) indicated that WELD  was not a 
likely resource.  There were nine comments provided by respondents as to why WELD 
would not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include, the 
preference of other internal resource options, lack of confidence in a satisfactory 
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outcome, and the fear of retaliation.  Organizational reasons include (a) the preference of 
utilizing the organization's established chain of command and (b) the non-investigative 
function of this entity. 
Resource:  Office of the Inspector General  
  Over 60% of the respondents (61.4%, n = 78) indicated that the OIG was not a 
likely resource.  There were 14 comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG 
was not a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include the 
preference of using alternate internal resource options, lack of confidence for a 
satisfactory outcome, fear of being labeled a crybaby or whiner, the length of time it 
would take to resolve the issue, and unfamiliarity with this entity as a viable resource. 
Resource:  Retaliation Prevention Unit  
Fewer than 60% (59.8%, n = 76) indicated that the RPU was not a likely resource.  
There were 10 comments provided by respondents as to why the RPU would not be a 
resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include the preference of 
utilizing other internal resource options, lack of confidence in achieving a satisfactory 
outcome of the issue, and fear of retaliation.  Organizational reasons include (a) a 
preference of utilizing the organization's established chain of command and (b) the non-
investigative function of the entity. 
Resource:  Behavioral Science Services 
Fewer than 80% of the respondents (77.0%, n = 97) indicated that BSS was not a 
likely resource.  There were 15 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would 
not be a resource option.  Individual reasons provided by respondents include the 
preference of utilizing alternate internal resource options, lack of confidence in achieving 
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a satisfactory outcome, and fear of retaliation.  Organizational reasons include (a) the 
preference of utilizing the organization's established chain of command, and (2) the non-
investigative function of the entity. 
Survey Responses: Part Two 
 The eight perceived impacts of whistle-blowing were analyzed as described in 
Chapter III.  Table D1 (see Appendix D) illustrates the perceived impacts of reporting 
specific acts of misconduct through internal department options.  To aid in the 
explanation of the results the presentation of findings will include (a) the highest 
percentages of respondents indicating a perceived likelihood of experiencing real or 
perceived consequences for reporting the listed type of misconduct, (b) the percentage of 
those indicating satisfactory resolution as an impact, (c) additional impacts or 
consequences described by respondents, and (d) the listing of recommendations for 
improvements provided by respondents. 
Reported Misconduct:  Sexual Harassment 
 For the reporting of consequences related to allegations of sexual harassment, 
alienation or silent treatment by peers (72.1%, n = 93) and harsh treatment by co-
workers (55.8%, n = 72) were selected with the highest frequency.  Satisfactory 
Resolution was selected by 53.8% (n = 70) of the respondents.  The percentage of 
respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting sexual 
harassment to any of the department resources is listed below (Table 13). 
There were eight comments provided by respondents regarding the impacts of 
reporting of sexual harassment.  Respondents indicated additional acts as, being restricted 
from working with specific partners or gender, increased stress, the need to transfer from 
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the division, establishing a career long reputation, receiving harsh treatment from 
supervisors, reduced work performance, lowered productivity, and family conflicts.   
Table 13  

















































































































Note. ª Combined Highly Likely and Likely totals. 
 
 
Reported Misconduct:  Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating Work Environment 
For the reporting of consequences related to allegations of a hostile, intimidating, 
or offensive work environment alienation or silent treatment from co-workers  
(70.5%, n = 91) and harsh treatment by peers (52.7%, n = 68) were selected with the 
highest frequency by respondents.  Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 47.3%  
(n = 62) of the respondents.  The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of 
experiencing consequences for reporting a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work 
environment to any of the department resources is illustrated below (Table 14).  There 
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were 12 comments provided by respondents regarding the impacts of reporting of a 
hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment.   
Table 14   
 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting a Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating 
Work Environment 
Impacts: 
Reporting a Hostile, 















































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals. 
 
 
 Respondents indicated additional acts as, receiving slow back-up assistance and 
loss of friendships, being labeled a malcontent, receiving harsh treatment from 
supervisors, increased levels of stress and reduced performance, and the possibility of not 
receiving future promotional oral interview opportunities. 
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Reported Misconduct: Disparate Treatment for Work-Related Disability 
For the reporting of consequences related to allegations of a disparate treatment 
for a work related disability alienation or the silent treatment from co-workers  
(50.0%, n = 63) and involuntary transfer of assignment (36.6%,  n = 50) were selected 
with the highest frequency by respondents.  Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 62% 
of the respondents and had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”.  The remaining seven impacts 
of reporting disparate treatment for a work-related disability received mode values of 1 or 
“Not Likely”.   
There were seven comments provided by respondents concerning the impact of 
reporting disparate treatment due to a work-related disability. Respondents indicated 
additional acts as, co-workers not being as willing to converse with the complaining 
party, decreased work motivation, and being “benched” (working desk duties) at the 
station with undesirable watch work hours.   
The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing 
consequences for reporting disparate treatment received due to a work related disability 
to any of the department resources is illustrated in Table 15. 
Reported Misconduct: Non-Selection for Promotion Due to Race or Gender 
For the reporting of consequences related to a non-promotion due to race or 
gender, alienation or the silent treatment from co-workers (61.2%, n = 79) and harsh 
treatment by co-workers (51.1%, n = 65) were selected with the highest frequency by 
respondents.  Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 62% (n = 80) of the respondents.  
Alienation or silent treatment had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”.  The remaining seven 
types of impacts received a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”.  The percentage of 
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respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting a non-
selection for promotion due to race or gender, to any of the department resources is 
illustrated in Table 16.  
There were no additional consequences or comments listed by respondents that 
concerned the reporting of a non-selection or pay-grade advancement due to race or 
gender to department options.  
Table 15  
 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Disparate Treatment for Work Related 
Disability 
Impacts: 



















































































































Table 16   
 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Non-selection for Promotion or 
Advancement 
Impacts: 
Reporting Non-selection for 













































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals. 
 
 
Reported Misconduct:  Gender or Racial Comments at Work 
For the reporting of consequences related to being subjected to gender or racial 
comments in the workplace, alienation or the silent treatment from co-worker 
(72.9%, n = 94) and harsh treatment by co-workers (54.3%, n = 70) were selected with 
the highest frequency by respondents.  Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 49.6% of 
the respondents (n = 64). The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of 
experiencing consequences for reporting being subjected to gender or racial comments in 
the workplace, to any of the department resources is illustrated in Table 17.  
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There was one comment provided by a respondent concerning the impact of 
reporting gender or racial comments in the workplace.  The respondent indicated that co-
workers would hesitate to speak to him or her.  
Table 17   
 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Gender and/or Racial Comments at 
Work 
Impacts: 
Reporting Gender and/or  













































































































Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals. 
 
 
Reported Misconduct: Personality Conflict With Supervisor With Negative Impacts 
For the reporting of consequences related to having a personality conflict with a 
supervisor with negative impacts, alienation or the silent treatment from co-worker 
(59.2%, n = 77) and a lowered performance evaluation (55 %, n = 71) were selected 
with the highest frequency by respondents.  Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 
32.3% of the respondents (n = 42). The percentage of respondents perceiving the 
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likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting a personality conflict with a 
supervisor with negative impacts is listed in Table 18.  
There were 15 comments provided by respondents concerning the impact of 
reporting a conflict with a supervisor with negative impact.  Respondents indicated 
additional impacts as, lost job opportunities, nit-picking of work, belittling, low work 
productivity and low job satisfaction, and being forced to transfer.  Several respondents 
indicated that the negative consequences would only be experienced if the supervisor in 
question was well-liked by others in the unit or division.   
Table 18  
 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting a Conflict with a Supervisor with 
Negative Impacts 
Impacts: 
Reporting a Conflict with a 



















































































































Reported Misconduct:  Denied Hardship Change of Watch or Assignment Request Due to 
Race or Gender 
For the reporting of consequences related to being denied a hardship request due 
to race or gender, alienation or the silent treatment from co-worker (55.5%, n = 71) and 
harsh treatment by co-workers (45.7%, n = 62) were selected with the highest frequency 
by respondents.  Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 32.3% (n = 42) of the 
respondents.  The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing 
consequences for reporting being denied a hardship request due to race or gender is 
shown below in Table 19.  There were no additional consequences listed by respondents 
that concerned the reporting of a denied change of watch or assignment hardship. 
Table 19  
 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting a Denied Hardship Request due to 
Race and/or Gender 
Impacts: 



















































































































Reported Misconduct:  Denied Specialized Training – Race or Gender 
For the reporting of consequences related to denied training due to race or gender, 
alienation or the silent treatment by peers (59.2%, n = 77) and lowered evaluation 
(55.0%, n = 71) were selected by the highest frequency of respondents. Satisfactory 
Resolution was selected by 36.4% of the respondents (n = 47). All eight types of 
reporting impact have a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”.  The percentage of respondents 
perceiving the likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting allegations of 
denied specialized training due to race or gender is listed in Table 20.  
Table 20   
 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Denied Specialized Training Due to 
Race/Gender 
Impacts: 
Reporting a Denied  



















































































































There were seven comments provided by respondents concerning the impact of 
reporting denied specialized training due to race and/or gender.  Respondents added 
comments relating to (a) lowered work productivity and (b) being excluded from future 
training. 
Respondents’ Recommendations for Improvement of Services 
There were a total of 75 comments provided by respondents for improving the 
current services provided to employees who are reporting specific misconduct 
allegations.  A large number of responses involve the needed review of current LAPD 
processes with respect to the reporting and investigation of misconduct complaints.  
Respondents recommended, an anonymous and confidential reporting system should be 
designed, that the reporting process be transparent and known to all employees and 
designed in a manner that allows the name of the reporting employee to be held in strict 
confidentiality and not be disclosed.   
Another process that was recommended was to remove the investigating function 
for the investigation of internal complaints of discrimination or harassment away from 
the confines of the department’s Internal Affairs Division.  Diversifying command staff 
and supervisory positions was also identified as a means for removing racial and other 
discriminatory practices from within the ranks of the organization.  Eight responses 
specifically involved the enhancement of management accountability.  Several 
respondents commented that commanding officers should be held to a higher standard of 
accountability for the work environment and for providing their subordinate supervisors 
with the trust and authority to make decisions.  Several respondents commented that the 
double standard of the administration of discipline between management and non-
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management personnel causes polarity within the organization that lends itself to mistrust 
and under-reporting of misconduct. 
Enhanced training was another category that drew a number of responses for 
improving current resource options for personnel.  Respondents indicated that there was a 
dire need for supervisors to become more aware of how to manage complaints of 
discrimination, harassment and disability medical restrictions.  Respondents 
recommended that the department should design a resource web-page and confidential 
“hotline” for employees who need assistance with discrimination and harassment without 
going through formal investigative channels.  One respondent commented:  
Threatening employees with retaliation is effective but causes more fear.  The 
process is laced with fear, embarrassment and uncertainty which causes under-
reporting and undermines the process when reported.  The culture does not want 
to accept that these problems exist.  We need more encouragement, trust and 
accountability for one’s actions to change this environment. (R71) 
 Several respondents suggested that getting the word out about the least known 
resources would help remove the mystery of what each resource function does and the 
uncertainty of how to get appropriate help.  Respondents additionally commented that 
improved training outside of an E-learning atmosphere where group discussions can take 
place would bring more of the issues out into the open.   
Additional Comments by Respondents 
There were 18 additional comments from respondents who described their 
perception of the organization, supervision and how reporting parties to misconduct are 
perceived.  Several respondents indicated that they perceive commanding officers as 
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being sophisticated enough to document adverse work performance so as not to appear 
like retaliation when the action is, in fact, retaliatory.  Many respondents perceive those 
who report misconduct as whiners or babies that use the system to get the promotions or 
assignments they do not deserve or to not work hard to achieve.  Several respondents 
perceive the department as having a ‘who you know not what you know’ type of 
bureaucracy where supervisors should be expected to set the tone and act professional 
whether a complaint is viable or not.  Many respondents indicated that this was not the 
common case, however. 
Several respondents recommended that employees seek assistance outside of the 
department for better assistance because of the lack of care taken by the department in 
managing complaints of peer wrongdoing.  Others recommended that the department do a 
better job of educating employees about how to prepare themselves for promotion so that 
gender and racial bias does not continue to be an excuse for those who are unprepared for 
promotion.  Several respondents opined that the department does less internal 
investigating of discrimination allegations because they are not trained well enough to 
manage the investigations without bias. 
Summary of Findings 
The data showed that department employees would most likely report any one of 
the eight most commonly reported types of employee misconduct listed in the survey 
instrument through the use of the LAPD’s established chain of command (supervisor and 
above).  The eight specific types of misconduct listed on the survey instrument included: 
sexual harassment, hostile work environment, disparate treatment due to a work-related 
disability, non-selection for promotion or pay-grade because of gender or racial bias, 
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gender and/or racial comments heard in the workplace, conflict with supervisor, being 
denied a hardship change of watch or assignment due to race or gender, and being 
denied specialized training due to race or gender.  Despite the varied specialized 
resources in place to manage misconduct on the LAPD, respondents indicated that the 
misconduct reporting avenues of Supervisor, below the rank of captain and Command or 
Staff Officer were both viable resource options for all eight types of misconduct. 
The next most frequently selected resources were Internal Affairs Group and 
Employee Relations Section.  The data showed that employees would likely report 
misconduct allegations related to sexual harassment, hostile-offensive or intimidating 
work environment, gender and/or racial comments at work, conflict with a supervisor, 
and being denied specialized training, within their chain of command and to Internal 
Affairs Group.  For the reporting of misconduct allegations related to disparate treatment 
for work-related disabilities, non-selection for promotion or pay-grade advancement due 
to race and/or gender, and denial of hardship change of watch or assignment request due 
to race and/or gender, respondents indicated they would likely utilize their chain of 
command and Employee Relations Group.  The resource option that would likely be the 
least utilized (over 60%) for the reporting of these specific allegations of misconduct was 
reported to be Behavioral Science Services and Office of the Inspector General. 
The survey instrument contained eight types of impact commonly reported by 
employees for reporting misconduct.  These impacts are: alienation or silent treatment, 
harsh treatment by peers, involuntary transfer, demeaning job assignments, “freeway 
therapy” (assigned far from home), lowered performance evaluations, demotion or 
downgrade, and satisfactory resolution.  The data showed that respondents reported the 
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highest frequency of real and/or perceived impacts (demeaning job assignment, “freeway 
therapy”, lowered performance evaluation, demotion or downgrade, harsh treatment by 
peers, and involuntary transfer) for reporting two specific types of misconduct (conflict 
with a supervisor, and denied hardship change of watch or assignment request).  
 Over 70% of the respondents believed they would be subject to harsh treatment 
by peers and alienation for reporting sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. 
Over 55% of the respondents indicated real or perceived negative impacts of alienation, 
lowered evaluation, and demeaning work would be the result of reporting a conflict with 
a supervisor.    
In terms of receiving a satisfactory resolution for the reporting of all eight types 
of misconduct, an average of 75% of the respondents indicated that they would not likely 
receive a satisfactory resolution to their report of misconduct.  Respondents indicated that 
reporting of disparate treatment due to work-related disability (62%) and sexual 
harassment (53%) would result in the highest positive outcomes.  The two types of 
misconduct that would result in the lowest perception or unlikelihood of a positive 
outcome reported by respondents were non-selection for promotion or pay grade 
advancement (62%), and reporting a conflict with a supervisor (67%). 
Respondents provided comments as to why particular resources would unlikely be 
utilized.  There were a total of 79 written responses provided by participants that 
addressed why particular resources would not be utilized. Individual reasons included 
fear of retaliation, preferences for an alternate resource, lack of confidence in a successful 
outcome, and preference to self-manage the issue without intervention.  Organizational 
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reasons included a preference for utilizing the organization’s chain of command, an 
entity’s lack of or poorly designed investigative role.   
Seventy-five respondents provided comments and suggestions for improving the 
current resource options for LAPD employees.  Recommendations from respondents 
included a combination of the following: (a) the necessity for enhanced communication 
channels between management and line officers, (b) improved training at all levels but 
particularly among the supervisory ranks, and (c) improved processes for the reporting 
and investigation of internal discrimination complaints.  Additionally, the design of an 
alternative reporting resource or one-stop shop for the reporting and investigating of all 
discrimination complaints with outside department oversight was commented upon 
frequently by respondents.  A one-stop resource for these types of complaints would 
lessen the confusion of having multiple resource options,  enhance department 
compliance with employment laws, and improve accountability for creating and 
maintaining a professional work environment that encourages misconduct reporting for 
these types of misconduct violations.  
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this study was to explore the act and impact of whistle-
blowing by police officers who report acts of organizational wrong-doing within the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD).  A close examination as to why police officers 
continue to file claims outside of the organization while a myriad of internal resolution 
avenues are provided for employees and how the organization responds to reported 
workplace wrong-doing was conducted to determine the gravity and scope of the issues 
involved within the LAPD.  It is believed that where evidence of dysfunction exist 
recommendations for changes or enhancement of current services can be made. 
Police, fire and military professions are very unique in that they each “possess an 
unparalleled need for loyalty, solidarity, and protection (Kingshott et al., 2004; Rothwell 
& Baldwin, 2007) given that they can be in a life threatening situation on any given day 
whether they work in a plain clothes assignment or when working a uniformed patrol 
function.  The fear of being isolated from other co-workers, losing promotional 
opportunities or career suicide are two of several significant causes for conscious and 
maybe even unconscious silencing by police officers who witness or experience 
organizational wrongdoing.  Rather than viewing the whistle-blower as being a 
“malcontent” with self-serving motives, whistle-blowers can be seen as “part of a 
strategy to maintain and improve quality” (Lewis, 1997, p. 5).  Failure on the part of any 
organization to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation or retribution after they report 




 To explore the affects of reporting wrong-doing within the LAPD, a self-
administered survey instrument was distributed to a sample of full-time sworn police 
officers of the LAPD in 2009.  Survey participants were randomly selected from within 
the ranks of Police Officer, Detective, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, and Commander.  
The survey instrument contained 17 questions designed to capture the likelihood of 
participants reporting eight specifically chosen types of misconduct to eight 
organizational resource entities available for the reporting of misconduct allegations 
made by employees of the LAPD.  Data was collected from 131 survey participants.  
Research Findings 
 The data analysis showed that police officers employed by the LAPD perceive the 
act of whistle-blowing and the subsequent impact of whistle-blowing as a negative 
process and experience.  The data showed that regardless of these reported real and 
perceived negative consequences of reporting organizational misconduct to LAPD 
internal resources, a large number of police officer employees would prefer to report 
specific types of misconduct through their chain of command as opposed to using 
specialized resources.  Police officers who reported that they would not likely utilize 
specific organizational internal resources cited the fear of retaliation, lack of faith in a 
satisfactory complaint resolution, and an unspoken code of silence, as the main reasons 
for non-disclosure.   
Recommendations were provided by officers for improving current internal 
resource options.  Some of these recommendations included the need for continuous 
training, particularly for supervisors, in workplace harassment and discrimination, a 
review and re-design of organizational processes and enhanced accountability for 
117 
 
command and staff officers for ensuring that reported issues and concerns are swiftly and 
properly addressed without the fear of retribution. The key findings and discussion of 
what these findings may represent are discussed from the perspective of four research 
questions. 
Research Question 1:  
What is the Reported Likelihood of Using Each of the Established  
Internal Misconduct Reporting Resources Based on Specific Misconduct Allegations? 
 The reported likelihood of using each of the established internal misconduct 
reporting resources varied among the resources and misconduct type.  Supervisors below 
the rank of Captain were selected by the highest number of respondents for the reporting 
of Gender or racial comments in the workplace (84%), and disparate treatment due to a 
work-related disability (75%).  The likelihood of reporting misconduct to Command or 
Staff Officers closely mirrored that of Supervisors.  Over 65% of the respondents 
indicated that they would report any of the eight types of misconduct types to Command 
or Staff Officers.  Over 73% indicated that they would report conflicts with supervisors 
and Command level personnel. 
Internal Affairs Group had a likelihood reporting average of over 40% for seven 
out of eight types of misconduct.  Over 67% of the respondents indicated that they would 
report gender and racial comments to this resource.  Over 50% of the respondents 
reported the likelihood of contacting Employee Relations Section for all eight types of 
misconduct types.   
The likelihood of using Work Environment Liaison Section, Office of the 
Inspector General and the Retaliation Prevention Unit were significantly low (under 
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40%) for reporting any of the eight misconduct types.  Comments provided by 
respondents indicated that these were the least known resources of the eight.  Behavioral 
Science Services ranked the lowest of likely use by the vast majority of respondents 
(21%).  Comments provided by respondents ranged from resignation to distrust. 
Research Question 2:  
Are There Differences in the Reported Likelihood of Using Internal  
Misconduct Reporting Resources Based on any Specific Acts of Employee Misconduct? 
The reported likelihood of using the eight established employee resources 
commonly used for the reporting of employee misconduct averaged slightly fewer than 
60% for reporting four out of eight specific acts of employee misconduct: Sexual 
harassment, Hostile/offensive, or intimidating work environment, gender/racial 
comments in the workplace, and disparate treatment due to a work-related disability.  Of 
the eight resources, respondents reported a more than 69% likelihood of reporting all 
eight misconduct types to a Supervisor and/or a Command or Staff officer; ranks or civil 
service classifications that fall within an employee’s chain of command. 
 Internal Affairs Group was the third most selected resource by over 60% of the 
respondents for the reporting of sexual harassment, hostile/offensive, or intimidating 
work environment and gender/racial comments in the workplace.  The least likely 
resources to be utilized for reporting any of the eight misconduct types were the Office of 





Research Question 3:  
What are the Expressed Reasons Given for any Misconduct Reporting Resources  
That are “Not Likely” to be Used for Reporting Specific Acts of Employee Misconduct? 
Of the less than 40% of the officers who would not use their chain of command, 
reasons provided ranged from a lack of confidence in particular supervisors or members 
of their command staff due to past experiences of peer or supervisory hostility to outright 
mismanagement of their reported complaint.  One respondent wrote, “I talked to a staff 
officer about a problem before.  The solution turned out to be worse than the problem" 
(R64).  Many officers also cited the need for enhanced supervisory training in the 
management of work related discrimination complaints. 
  Comments related to the use of Internal Affairs Group drew some of the most 
direct and openly hostile comments by officers, although many would reportedly contact 
this resource for incidents related to sexual harassment and hostile work environment 
issues.  Comments from respondents ranged from a lack of overall confidence in a 
successful outcome of their complaint, fear of retaliation and a lack of trust in how 
investigations are conducted.  One respondent wrote "I have felt retaliation for reporting 
misconduct in the past from the accused and the investigating officer at Internal Affairs" 
(R81).   
The resource options of the Work Environment Liaison Division, Office of the 
Inspector General, and the Retaliation Prevention Unit, received similar comments with 
respect to the reporting of most of the eight types of misconduct.  Respondents indicated 
a general lack of trust felt by officers who are not aware of what these entities actually 
do.  Of those who knew of the resource’s particular function, several respondents 
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commented on the non-investigatory function of the unit as a reason why they would not 
utilize these resources.   
Behavioral Science Services drew the highest number of comments from 
respondents.  Comments included a lack of confidence in a successful outcome or ability 
to help resolve the issue at hand, and preference to self-manage the issue without internal 
psychological intervention.  A number of officers indicted that they would prefer to seek 
assistance from outside psychologists rather than use the department resource.   
Research Question 4:  
What are the Perceived Consequences of Participating in the Whistle-Blowing Process? 
As stated earlier, Police, fire and military professions are very unique in that they 
each “possess an unparalleled need for loyalty, solidarity, and protection (Kingshott et al., 
2004; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  This being said, the fears associated with reporting 
peer misconduct are as real as the acts themselves.  The reporting of gender and/or racial 
workplace comments, sexual harassment, and a hostile/offensive or intimidating work 
environment was reported as attracting the highest likelihood of negative impact.  Over 
72% of the respondents indicated they would be subjected to alienation or silent 
treatment from their peers after reporting these acts to any of the internal resources.  
These acts of misconduct were also reported by respondents (over 74%) as the most 
likely types of misconduct to be reported to supervisors and commanding officers. 
Slightly fewer than 50% of the respondents reported the real or perceived fear of 
receiving an involuntary transfer of assignment for reporting gender or racial comments 
at work, sexual harassment, hostile/offensive or intimidating work environment.  Of the 
eight types of misconduct, sexual harassment and disparate treatment due to having a 
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work-related disability were perceived to yield the most satisfactory results if reported to 
the department.  Although there were a large percentage of respondents who perceived 
these consequences, these perceptions had minimal effect on the number of those who 
would actually report specific types of misconduct.   
Conclusions 
This study sought to examine the act and impact of police officers who report peer 
wrong-doing or specific types of misconduct through the use of internal resource options.  
The following conclusions were drawn from this study: 
Conclusion 1:  
The LAPD Culture Inhibits the Internal  
Reporting of Specific Types of Organizational Misconduct 
This study revealed that over 40% of the officers who completed the survey 
instrument believed that there would be one or more negative impacts of reporting 
certain types of misconduct through department channels and over 50% would not 
utilize the majority of specialized departmental entities in place for assisting in the 
resolution of these types of complaints.  Officers cited a myriad of reasons as to why 
they believed reporting through department channels was futile.  Many believed that the 
reporting process and reporting resource options yielded insufficient resolution options.  
Others believed that the LAPD culture was far too rigid to change what is believed to be 
a culture shrouded in secrecy, silence and the sequestering of peer wrongdoing. 
Additionally, between the years 2004 and 2009, a number of civil lawsuits filed 
by sworn police officers of the LAPD have resulted in significantly high plaintiff 
awards.  An analysis of these lawsuits indicates that employees who had attempted to 
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report specific types of organizational misconduct through the use of internal resources 
were met with less than favorable outcomes. 
Conclusion 2: 
 The Existence of Multiple Internal Whistle-Blower Resource Options 
 Inhibits Rather Than Supports the Internal Disclosure of Organizational Wrongdoing. 
The LAPD has in excess of eight internal resource options for the reporting of 
specific types of organizational misconduct.  These entities offer LAPD employees a 
number of resource options for resolving complaints of a serious or minor nature.  For 
example employees may opt to confidentially report to department psychologists who 
have the power and authority to restrict access to most information disclosed by the 
employee with the exception of disclosing acts that may cause physical harm to the 
reporting individual or others.  However, this study showed that over 80% of the 
employees surveyed would not use this resource.  Employees may also opt to initiate 
formal grievances, cause formal complaint investigations to be initiated, arrange for 
informal mediation procedures, or seek to initiate formal or informal counseling sessions 
for affected employees.   
These options are in place to resolve any act committed by a department 
employee that may violate standard operating procedures.  However, this study showed 
that the number of employees utilizing these resources ranged from a low 17% to 50%.  
This fluctuation in distribution may be indicative of the large number of employees who 
were unsure of where to seek resolution options.  Many employees commented that the 
high number of resources caused overwhelm and confusion when deciding where to 
seek the best resource option. 
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Conclusion 3:  
A Rigid Reporting System for the Reporting of  
Organizational Misconduct and Inconclusive Investigations  
Inhibit Employees From Utilizing the Internal Reporting Process 
The LAPD mandates that any employee who becomes aware of misconduct shall 
immediately report the misconduct to a department supervisor or be subjected to an 
allegation of misconduct for failing to report the misconduct in a timely manner.  This 
study showed that regardless of the mandatory reporting process there was evidence of 
conflicting choices about where, how and when to report specific types of misconduct.  
Hostile work environment complaints are difficult to place reporting limitations upon 
when the degree of offensiveness varies from person to person.  With these types of 
issues, internal investigations have the tendency to end up focusing more on the 
complainant’s failure to report the conduct in a timely manner rather than focus on the 
misconduct being reported.  Civil lawsuits filed by police officers employed by the 
LAPD also demonstrate that the confidence of resolving misconduct complaints often fall 
short of a satisfactory resolution due to lengthy investigations, unknown disciplinary 
actions due to confidentiality provisions and limited protection for the whistle-blower. 
Additionally, internal investigations that are inconclusive fail to remedy the behavior 
being reported and all involved employees are faced with remaining in an environment 
that may be hostile or offensive for one or more employees.  One respondent cited his or 




Threatening employees is effective but causes more fear.  The process is laced 
with fear, embarrassment and uncertainty which causes under-reporting and 
undermines the process when reported.  The culture does not want to accept that 
these problems exist.  We need more encouragement, trust and accountability for 
one’s actions to change this environment. (R71) 
Conclusion 4:  
Administrative Oversight (e.g., Internal Affairs Investigative  
Complaint Process) for the Management of Reportable Employment  
Discrimination is a Source of Loose Compliance or Non-Compliance  
of Federal, State, and City Employment Discrimination Laws and Regulations. 
Employment discrimination is investigated by the LAPD as an act of 
organizational misconduct rather than a violation of federal, and city laws.  Investigations 
involving reported discrimination are often closed as “Unresolved” when there are no 
witnesses to the conduct and the investigation falls short of evidence needed to hold 
anyone accountable for the conduct.  An “Unresolved” investigation does not stop the 
reported behavior and often results in organizational non-compliance of the law by failing 
to maintain a work environment free of discriminatory conduct where the reporting 
employee feels unsupported and unprotected by the organization.  
Many officers cited experiences of retaliation that followed reports of misconduct 
that mirrored race and/or gender discrimination.  Several commented on real or perceived 
acts of retaliation that were expressed by those investigating the very acts that were being 
reported.  Others strongly recommended that an in-house one-stop investigatory resource 
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outside of departmental control would encourage internal misconduct reporting and 
lessen the need for external reporting.   
Implications for the LAPD 
The high number of officers who reported the likelihood (over 70%) of reporting 
specific types of misconduct or peer wrongdoing to a member of their chain of command 
for any of the eight types listed, was a significant finding.  On one hand, this finding may 
be used by command staff to recognize the need to use this influence to recognize the 
need to train and empower their subordinate supervisors in managing employee versus 
employee workplace gender and/or racially motivated conflicts swiftly and appropriately.  
This enhanced level of service in managing these employee issues would ensure 
compliance with Federal, State, City laws and other codified regulations for the proper 
management of employee discrimination.  This level of the organization may be the most 
influential arm of the LAPD in beginning the process of needed change in how whistle-
blowing is viewed, interpreted and managed by command staff and frontline supervisors. 
Implications for Practice  
 The present study contributes to the body of whistle-blowing literature by 
examining the act and impact of reporting organizational misconduct within a large 
municipal police agency with multiple reporting resource options.  Previous whistle-
blowing literature has not explored the area of whistle-blowing from the perspective of 
police officers within one municipal police department, nor has whistle-blowing literature 
explored the impact that whistle-blowing has on police officers who have a myriad of 
internal resource options.   
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 The present study demonstrates that having strict reporting control measures that 
demand the immediate reporting of organizational wrongdoing by employees (or be 
subjected to disciplinary action) and having numerous internal reporting resources is not 
enough to encourage internal whistle-blowing, nor does it protect the whistle-blower 
from any real or perceived fears associated with misconduct reporting.  Studies show that 
both internal and external whistle-blowers tend to view their organizations as 
unsupportive and having less than effective avenues for resolving complaints of wrong-
doing (Miceli, Van Scotter, Near, & Rehg, 2001).  This present study contributes to these 
previous whistle-blowing studies.  These findings showed that multiple number resource 
options and rigid misconduct reporting mandates are less than adequate to encourage the 
internal reporting of organizational wrongdoing.  This study adds to current whistle-
blowing research as few studies examine whistle-blowing from an organization’s ability 
to self-regulate reported wrongdoing with multiple resource options.   
The LAPD may be the only municipal policing agency to be studied for the 
impact of reporting misconduct to an excess of eight internal resource options.  This 
study outlines the importance of open and transparent lines of communication between 
available multiple resource options, management, and employee-whistle-blowers. 
Organizations with centralized structures have demonstrated their attempt to 
accommodate whistle-blowers by creating a decentralized style of management. 
A decentralized management style provides managers with flexibility in decision-making 
for resolving reported wrong-doing without involving upper management.  This type of 
style is said to encourage internal whistle-blowing (Andrews, 2006).  The high number of 
respondents who would report wrongdoing to their chain of command (over 70%) 
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supports past research, however, negative mindsets that dismiss whistle-blowing, can also 
create a culture that contributes to external whistle-blowing. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations focus on creating and maintaining a work 
environment that encourages whistle-blowing as an act of loyalty to the profession and 
commitment to the continuous improvement of services provided to employees while 
decreasing the fear of organizational cannibalism.  These recommendations are based on 
the collected survey data: 
1. A risk management triage team made up of specially trained sworn and civilian 
supervisors and managers should convene on a regular (quarterly) basis to address 
issues and resolution options for complaints of employment discrimination, 
harassment and discrimination   
2. LAPD managers and supervisors should receive mandated classroom training in 
conflict resolution, mediation techniques, and employment laws on a yearly basis  
3. An audit of current LAPD resource options should be conducted to ensure 
compliance with City, State, and Federal employment discrimination laws 
pertaining to the investigation of reported complaints and maintaining a 
discrimination-free workplace 
4. Design a “Code of Conduct” to be distributed to all employees that is enforced at 
all levels of the organization 
5. Department recognized employee resources must have a confidential “right to 
know, need to know” open door policy that allows for confidential networking 
and transparency of information among each of the resources 
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6. Create a clearly defined reporting structure for employees that describe the 
functions of all specialized reporting avenues to remove the fear and uncertainty 
associated with unfamiliar resources. 
Methodological Limitations and Internal Validity 
Methodological Limitations 
The response rate for the survey was considerably less than what had been hoped 
for.  With only 18% responding, questions regarding the ability to create a “safe” 
environment for officers to share their beliefs and experiences for these highly sensitive 
issues continue along with the speculations that the high number of recently closed 
lawsuits and the increasing number of pending lawsuits may have influenced those who 
chose not to participate.  There were a number of officers who returned surveys with 
handwritten “no thanks!” or other statements regarding the inability to change the culture 
of LAPD.  Nevertheless, since valid sampling methods were used, these 131 officers’ 
views are representative of the LAPD though not all views of the 8300 workforce are 
included.  This impacts the external validity and recommendations must be made with 
some level of caution.   
Ensuring Internal Validity of Interpreted Data 
Careful and deliberate multiple reviews of the qualitative data following 
Creswell’s (2003) strategies supported internal validity. This process involved the 
selection of a second researcher. In order to ensure reliable interpretation of the 
qualitative data, the coded data was reviewed in depth by a peer examiner experienced in 
textual analysis. Coding results were discussed and included extensive discussions 
regarding any identifiable conclusions or possible misinterpretations.  The coding process 
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continued until consensus was obtained. Several areas presented challenging 
considerations; these involved the determination of relationships among comments that 
did not comply with instructions given to survey participants, and ensuring researcher 
objectivity.  As a law enforcement officer employed by the organization being surveyed it 
was critically important to be self-aware and to be able to acknowledge when personal 
assumptions or bias may possibly interfere with the coding or interpretation of comments.  
One way to deter this from occurring was to engage in frequent dialogue with the co-
reviewer about emerging patterns until a consensus was received. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Although much was learned from this study, there is much to be learned about the 
act and impact of whistle-blowing within a closed, rigid, command and control 
organizational setting.  Researchers interested in studying the act and impact of police 
whistle-blowing could consider studying the effects of whistle-blowing from the 
perspectives of both civilian and sworn personnel within the policing profession.  By 
studying varied sub-cultures within a given organization or profession, it may be possible 
to gain more comprehensive data resulting in greater insight into the influence of peer 
and organizational retaliation on the whistle-blowing process.  
Closing Remarks 
I am a 29-year veteran of the LAPD.  I feel fortunate to have been given the 
opportunity to conduct this study after 29 years as a sworn police officer for the LAPD, 
and after having worked at one or more of the resource options listed in the survey.  My 
tenure as an LAPD officer and investigating detective came full circle during this study.  
I began my career interviewing potential victims of employee harassment and enter the 
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last few years of active duty interviewing potential victims of workplace retaliation.  
Much has changed over the years on the LAPD in terms of the rising level of interest in 
recognizing where cultural change is necessary and doable without waiting for the next 
court finding.  During this year-long journey I gained additional insight into the largely 
unknown and often questioned motives of the police officer as organizational whistle-
blower.  I spent 14 years as the LAPD’s Sexual Harassment Counselor and I have 
interviewed or participated in the interviewing of hundreds of department sworn and 
civilian employees with respect to complaints of harassment, work discrimination, and 
retaliation.  I currently supervise a newly formed unit that oversees adverse actions taken 
against employees involved in lawsuits, grievances and formal personnel complaints in 
hopes of lessening the rising plaintiff awards, and in time, preventing real or perceived 
acts of retaliation. 
During my tenure with working three of the eight employee resources I learned 
that sometimes bad people bring bad circumstances and experiences onto themselves. 
And, other times, bad things happen to the undeserving.  That is a significant lesson for 
me because it keeps me grounded after listening to the stories of those who feel betrayed 
by their co-workers, friends and supervisors when their heartfelt complaint goes 
unresolved or unattended to.  The LAPD has been under close scrutiny by the Federal 
courts since 1979.  Sadly, it took three court imposed consent decrees and a growing 
number of civil lawsuits for the LAPD to move beyond age-old rigid mindsets and an 
antiquated discipline system to demand compliance to its policies and procedures.  The 
policies are not working to control behavior.  Rigid command and control of reporting 
mandates do not work to control the reporting of wrongdoing (Barnett, Cochran, & 
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Taylor, 1993, Bather & Kelly, 2005).  Specialized units impose self-regulated 
confidentiality policies that do not allow for a free information exchange, or triaging of 
resolution strategies between the sections or units.  Complaints are often being 
investigated by one or more resource options leading to duplicated efforts with weak or 
ineffective resolution options. 
Written policies are not enough to change mindsets, as demonstrated by the 
growing number of police civil lawsuits.  I heard it once said that the problem with the 
LAPD’s police force is that the City Personnel Department recruits from the human race.  
As such, differences are expressed, rights are defended, misconduct allegations generate 
stronger control mechanisms, justice is gained by filing civil lawsuits, and the hamster 
moves with no destination in mind.  It takes strong leadership to set the tone of 
professional conduct.  As long as gallows humor exists among police officers to describe 
the misfortunes of one another and the citizens they serve, as long as a written code of 
conduct fails to exist or hold employees accountable for, as long as managers continue to  
blindly endorse discipline up the chain of command without an independent and objective 
viewpoint, and as long as the person at the top fails to address the cries of help from 
within, organizational discrimination followed by the personal vindication of civil 
lawsuits and large plaintiff awards will continue to rise.   
The majority of officers I have met, worked with, counseled, or interviewed have 
one thing in common.  Some managers and supervisors are quick to label whistle-blowers 
as lazy malcontents who use the system for personal gain and personal vendettas.  There 
are managers and supervisors who flippantly interpret the external reporting of 
misconduct as an act of disloyalty or worse, an act of organizational terrorism.  And, in 
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the midst of these negative mindsets about the external reporting of misconduct 
violations, over 70% of the respondents in this study reported that middle management 
and command leaders would be their initial reporting avenue for allegations of 
misconduct.  Negative mindsets breed contempt and inaction by those with the most 
power and influence to correct behavior and effect needed change to a culture that is 
feeding on itself.   
In my personal experience with reports of internal workplace harassment 
however, I have found that many of our organizational whistle-blowers are seasoned 
police officers who came into this line of work for all the right reasons; to protect and 
serve others.  With many officers, there is a belief that they, as police officers should be 
protected from harm from within and served by the organization when violations are 
reported.  Loyalty is a two-way street.  I recently met with an officer who is the main 
plaintiff in a lawsuit involving over 2000 LAPD officers that was recently settled for a 
large figure.  I saw the tears in his eyes when he described sacrificing his time with his 
family to work long hours without one blemish to his record.  And when he attempted to 
report act of perceived retaliation, he was unable to get satisfactory assistance to stop the 
reported conduct.  He decided to “fight back” by having his day in court.  When I asked if 
he was ready to retire soon, he responded, “what for?  I love this job…that’s the one 
thing they can’t take from me.”  That was my paradigm shift.  For a moment, I felt the act 
and impact of whistle-blowing from his perspective: a gut wrenching feeling of 
disappointment mixed with anger for the senselessness behind it all. 
 The effects of whistle-blowing can remain with the individual whistle-blower or 
it can infiltrate into a small squad or unit at the blink of an eye lowering morale, 
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productivity and organizational pride.  Minimizing the risk of liability from retaliation 
and discrimination lawsuits in both public and private industries can be minimized with a 
(a) proactive approach by management that encourages and commends whistle-blowing 
by employees, (b) the establishment of well-defined protection policies that project a zero 
tolerance for retaliation against any employee who brings forward reports of 
organizational wrongdoing, (c) a clearly defined process for reporting organizational 
wrongdoing that is a confidential and supportive means for resolving complaints and 
concerns, (d) the development of appropriate training programs for managers and 
supervisors for the no-nonsense management and investigation of employment 
discrimination complaints, and (e) a strong disciplinary approach to manage those who 
violate employment discrimination laws and policies and to hold managers strictly 
accountable for their diligence in resolving workplace issues within their respective 
assignments and commands. 
In this study an attempt was made to determine the cause and effect of whistle-
blowing and the influence that departmental internal entities have on the reporting 
process.  I have met my initial objectives for contributing to the whistle-blowing body of 
knowledge by demonstrating how multiple resource options and rigid misconduct-
reporting policies fail to encourage internal whistle-blowing.  And, I have offered 
recommendations for the enhancement of services offered to the men and women of the 
LAPD.  This study only touches the surface of the work that is still needed to be done in 
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